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COMMENT
VICTIMIZED AGAIN:
THE USE OF AN AVOIDABILITY PRESUMPTION AND
THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR GOOD FAITH TO
DEPRIVE PONZI VICTIMS OF THEIR DEFENSES
Melanie E. Migliacciot
I. INTRODUCTION

Robert Kowell and his mother Edna were looking for a way to invest
their money.' Robert learned that an American company, J.T. Wallenbrock
& Associates, was offering an opportunity to invest in accounts receivable.2
The company explained that Malaysian latex glove manufacturers regularly
had to wait eighty to ninety days to be paid on shipped goods.3 Wallenbrock
purchased "these manufacturers' accounts receivables at a significant
discount, providing the glove manufacturers with immediate access to
working capital. Walienbrock investors, in turn, would enjoy a 20 percent
return when Wallenbrock collected the receivables from glove purchasers in
due time."' The Kowells invested roughly $23,000 with the company and
received the payments as promised.' The Kowells' investment eventually
earned about $50,000, and, satisfied with their earnings, the Kowells
redeemed the principal and terminated the investment.' The Kowells had
received payments just as the company had represented, and nothing about
the transactions suggested to Robert and Edna that the opportunity was not
a legitimate investment.
t Symposium Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 8. J.D. Candidate,
Liberty University School of Law (2014); B.A., Education, The Evergreen State College
(1991). My sincere thanks to attorney Bertrand A. Zalinsky, who encouraged my research in
this area and patiently listened to my ideas. The purpose of this Comment is to provide solid
legal arguments for victims of Ponzi schemes who are drawn into an adversarial proceeding
by a bankruptcy trustee intent on clawing back through the fraudulent transfer provisions
what little the victims received from the debtor.
1. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 2008).
2. Id. at 767.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 773.

6. Id.
7. Id. at 766.
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The Kowells were shocked, therefore, to receive a letter years later' from
Wallenbrock's receiver' informing them that Wallenbrock "had been
declared a Ponzi scheme."'o The receiver, citing no legal authority,
demanded that they repay nearly $70,000 in "profits" from the scheme."
The receiver urged the Kowells to "take advantage of this one-time offer to
settle with the Receivership estate for 90% of the profit you received" by
executing a settlement agreement and enclosing a check. 2 Robert Kowell
expressed disbelief that Wallenbrock was a fraudulent company and
questioned how he could be liable to other investors when he didn't know it
was a fraudulent scheme. 3 He questioned how he could have received
"profits" if his investment was "$.00."I4 Further, Robert confessed that "the
money received in payments had been spent long ago" and that payment to
the receiver of nearly $70,000 would force him to declare bankruptcy." By
return letter, the receiver threatened:
If you refuse to work out a settlement agreement with us, we will
sue you and that will be your only option. It is not what we want
for either you or your mother, however ....

If you hire an

attorney, you may certainly file a motion to bar the Receiver
from collecting money from those that profited. Both the
Receiver and the SEC would file objections and it would
probably take about $20,000.00 in legal fees for you to file such a
motion."
Robert, outraged and incredulous, refused to sign the settlement; the
receiver filed an adversarial complaint in federal district court. 7 Four years
8. The record is not clear as to when the Kowells terminated their relationship with
Wallenbrock. The investigation by the SEC began in 2002 and the Kowells received the letter
from the receiver two years after that. Id. at 768.
9. The company was placed in receivership when the Securities and Exchange
Commission began investigating the company. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The letter claimed the Kowells had invested "$.00" dollars in principal and
therefore demanded return of $69,546.70 in profits. Id. The letter calculated the settlement to
be 90% of that figure-$62,592.03. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Kowell had paid federal income tax on the "profits" he had received. Id. at 773.
15. Id. at 768.
16. Id. (ellipsis in the original).
17. Id. at 768-769.
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later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant
of summary judgment against Robert and Edna. The court ordered them to
pay $26,396 in profits and then granted the receiver's request for an
additional $5,159 levied against the Kowells for pre-judgment interest."
One might be tempted to condemn Ponzi scheme victims as being
"greedy dopes" who gambled on an investment that was too good to be
true." But many modern Ponzi schemes are sophisticated and are
perpetrated by well-known professionals. The Madoff scheme, which
accrued an estimated $50 billion in investor losses, ranks as the largest
Ponzi scheme to date.20 Madoff Securities was a registered and insured
securities brokerage firm, and Bernard Madoff had a reputation earned in a
legitimate business.2 Until the Madoff scheme imploded, the Petters
scheme was the largest.22 Thomas Petters ran a decade-long scheme that
accrued losses to investors of $3.8 billion. Petters used some of the Ponzi
23
funds to acquire legitimate companies, including Polaroid Corporation.
The Bayou scheme involved investment funds serving both individuals and
financially sophisticated institutional investors.24 Bayou's annual financial
statements contained certification from a certified public accounting firm,
attesting to the accuracy of the information." Unfortunately, the accounting
firm was fictitious.2 6 The Bayou funds collapsed in 2005, after a nine-year
run,27 and the bankruptcy trustee "brought 131 separate adversary

18. Id. at 766. Although the record does not state the attorney fees expended by the
Kowells, one can realistically expect that four years of litigation and appeal to the Ninth
Circuit Court exceeded all of the "profits" the Kowells made on their investment.
19. Richard Posner, BernardMadoff and Ponzi Schemes-Posner's Comment, BECKERPOSNER BLOG, (December 21, 2008), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2008/12/bemardmadoff-and-ponzi-schemes--posners-comment.html. (characterizing Ponzi scheme victims
as "greedy dopes" conned by "ludicrous pitches" and "the least sophisticated, or those most
blinded by greed").
20. Clarence L. Pozza, Jr. et al., A Review of Recent Investor Issues in the Madoff,
Stanford and FortePonzi Scheme Cases, 10 J.Bus. & SEC. L.113, 115 (2010).
21. Posner, supra note 19.
22. Mychal A. Bruggeman, Polaroid Expands Ponzi Presumption, 31-JUL AM. BANKR.
INST.

J. 22,

23.

22 (2012).

Id.

24. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 439 B.R. 284,291 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
25. Id.

26. Id.
27. Id.
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proceedings" against investor victims.28 The Bennett scheme investors,
including a number of banks, never dreamed they were investing in a Ponzi
scheme because the conservative rate of return was well below the legal
maximum. 2 9 The Bennett bankruptcy trustee sued 10,000 individual
investor victims.30 Attorney Scott Rothstein perpetrated a scheme selling
fictitious legal settlements to investors, who eventually lost $1.2 billion
when the fraud collapsed."' Allen Stanford scammed $8 billion from
investors through the sale of certificates of deposit by Stanford International

Bank.3 2

Recent Ponzi schemes have victimized even prudent and experienced
investors. 3 Many investors face significant financial loss-only to discover
that they are being sued by the bankruptcy trustee. In any bankruptcy, by
definition, the debtor's assets will not cover the debtor's liabilities, and some
creditors will not get what the debtor contractually promised. In a Ponzi
scheme, there may be hundreds or thousands of innocent investor creditors,
who may have lost their life savings and may be facing bankruptcy
themselves as a result of the fraud. In the face of widespread financial
catastrophe, courts have two options. They can either adhere to the wellestablished legal doctrine of fraudulent transfer and "allow the losses to rest
where they fell,"" or they can create new judicial rules to deal with Ponzi
schemes-rules that seem more "equitable." Many courts have chosen the
second approach.
The Bankruptcy Code gives to bankruptcy trustees two tools to enlarge
the pool of funds from which to pay creditors by avoiding, or undoing,
certain transfers between the perpetrator of the scheme and the investor
transferee. Under the preference provision,3 6 the bankruptcy trustee may
28. Paul Sinclair, The Sad Tale of FraudulentTransfers: The Unscrupulous Are Rewarded
and the DiligentAre Punished,28-APR AM. BANKR. INST. J.16, 78 (2009).
29. David F. Kurzawa II, When FairConsiderationIs Not Fair, 11 CORNEU J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 461, 463 (2002). The rate of return was 8-12%, well below the maximum rate of 16%
allowed by banking law. Id.
30. Id.
31. Louis R. Davis & Linus Wilson, Good Timing? How One Bank Cut Its Link to A $1.2
Billion Ponzi Scheme, 18-OCT J.LEGAL EcoN., 1,2 (2011).
32. Spencer C. Barasch & Sara J. Chesnut, ControversialUses of the "Clawback"Remedy
in the CurrentFinancialCrisis,72 TEx. B.J. 922, 924 (2009).
33. Pozza, supra note 20, at 114.
34. Id. at 120.
35. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 776 (9th Cir. 2008).
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006); see also infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the scope of § 547).
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avoid all transfers made to creditors so that the court may redistribute those
funds to other creditors. Preference avoidance seeks equality of distribution
but is limited to transfers made within ninety days of bankruptcy." Under
the fraudulent transfer provision, the bankruptcy trustee may avoid
transfers where the transferee gained a windfall at the expense of the debtor
and, therefore, the creditors." It is critical to note that the issue of avoidance
does not address the question of whether an investor who lost money in a
Ponzi scheme is entitled to recover her money from the debtor. Rather,
avoidance seeks to claw back" from the investor those funds she already
received from the debtor. Part II of this Comment traces the evolution of
fraudulent transfer doctrine and highlights Supreme Court precedent
interpreting the preference and fraudulent transfer provisions.
In recent years, courts have rejected the application of traditional
fraudulent transfer doctrine to Ponzi schemes. Most courts now presume
that all transfers in a Ponzi scheme are avoidable under the fraudulent
transfer provision." Application of this avoidability presumption gives the
bankruptcy trustee complete power to claw back from innocent victims
money they previously received from the debtor. This presumption destroys
an innocent investor victim's first line of defense-the ability to. argue that
the transfer is not avoidable. Where courts apply the avoidability
presumption, an investor victim's only hope is the "good faith defense."
Most courts, however, now apply an objective standard, rather than the
traditional subjective standard to good faith.42 The objective standard
effectively destroys an investor victim's second line of defense-the chance
37. See § 547; see also In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 270 B.R. 92, 99 (Bankr. D. Conn.
2001) affd, 286 B.R. 480 (D. Conn. 2002) (distinguishing between distributional equality as
the goal of preference statutes and distributional enhancement as the goal of fraudulent
transfer statutes).
38. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006); see also infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the scope of § 548).
39. See § 548; Carrozella, 270 B.R. at 99 (noting that the goal of fraudulent transfer
avoidance is distributional enhancement of the estate).
40. The term "claw back" refers to the trustee's power to avoid transfer and "claw back"
that property into the estate. See NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAc. 3d DICT. OF BANKR. TERMS §
C55.
41. See, e.g., In re IFS Fin. Corp., 417 B.R. 419, 439 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) subsequently
affd, 669 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2012) ("The Fifth Circuit and other circuits have repeatedly held
that the existence of a fraudulent scheme itself is sufficient to find that a transfer made in
furtherance of that scheme was made with fraudulent intent.").
42. See In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 444 B.R. 767, 773 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (noting
that "[riecent case law strongly favors an objective approach to assessing a transferee's good
faith" but nevertheless rejecting the objective standard).
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to prove lack of culpability. Part III of this Comment analyzes the
insufficient legal basis for adopting the avoidability presumption and the
objective standard of good faith. Additionally, Part III analyzes some of the
inequitable results of courts' adoption of these doctrines. Part IV suggests a
simple process to correctly apply fraudulent transfer doctrine to Ponzi
schemes.
II. BACKGROUND

Fraudulent transfer doctrine, including the principle that a transferee
acting in good faith should be immune from avoidance, became wellestablished in our nation's bankruptcy jurisprudence through decades of
analysis by courts and commentators. Part A infra traces the establishment
of a uniform bankruptcy code, noting the emergence of a codified
fraudulent transfer provision. Part B infra discusses the nature of fraudulent
transfers through analysis of United States Supreme Court opinions and
scholarly authority. Part B concludes with an analysis of the current
Bankruptcy Code provisions covering avoidance of transfers. Part C infra
traces the relatively recent spread of new interpretations of fraudulent
transfer doctrine that are at odds with prior well-established principles.
A. NationalBankruptcy Laws
The drafters of the Constitution viewed bankruptcy primarily as a
business and interstate commerce issue. During discussion of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause,4 3 a delegate from South Carolina suggested that
Congress be given the power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws." A few
days later, the Bankruptcy Clause was adopted with virtually no debate,"5
and two weeks after that, the proposed Constitution was signed and sent to
43. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §l.
44. 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAc. 3D § 1:3 (2013). The delegate,
Charles Pinkney, recommended the following language: "To establish uniform laws upon the
subject of bankruptcies and respecting the damages arising on the protest of foreign bills of
exchange." Id. Another South Carolinian, John Rutledge, recommended that the clause be
placed immediately after the Naturalization Clause in Article I, Section 8, Clause 4. Id.
45. Id. The bankruptcy clause was approved on September 3. Id. The delegate from
Connecticut alone voted against the bankruptcy clause; he feared the power granted would
allow Congress to legislate the death penalty for bankruptcy, as some early English law had
done. Id. The final version of the clause states, "To establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

2013]
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the states for ratification.' The Bankruptcy Clause vests in Congress the
power "to establish ...

uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies

throughout the United States.""
1. Constitutional Purpose of the Bankruptcy Clause
The drafters of the Constitution intended the federal government to be
one of enumerated powers only; therefore, each power granted to Congress
is designed for a specific purpose. The purpose of many Article I, Section 8
powers, including the Bankruptcy Clause, is to remove from the states and
grant to Congress those powers which benefit commerce." The drafters of
the Constitution understood that the issue of bankruptcy is an integral part
of interstate commerce.4 ' For example, James Madison supported the
Bankruptcy Clause because uniform laws would protect creditors and
facilitate the smooth flow of interstate commerce.so
The Founders did not seek to ensure justice in any particular case of
bankruptcy or for individuals per se." Rather, their goal was to establish a
uniform system of bankruptcy that would "give security to all contracts,
stability to credit, uniformity among the States in those things which
materially concern the foreign commerce of the country, and [the States']
own credit."S2 Although the Bankruptcy Clause grants Congress the power
to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies,"" the Constitution
goes even further. The Constitution specifically prohibits states from

46. U.S. CONsT. art. VII. The Constitution was signed on September 17. Id.
47. Hanover Nat. Bankv. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 183 (1902) (quoting U.S. CONsT, art. I, §
8, cl. 4).
48. F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW 90 (William S. Hein & Co. ed.
2003) (1919) ("The obvious purpose of the architects of the Constitutionin [Article I, section
8] was to confer complete control on the Congress of any power which contributes to the
benefit of commerce in general."). The drafters' goal was a unified national economy. Id.
49. NORTON, supra note 44, § 1:3.
50. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1982) ("As James
Madison observed, '[T]he power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately
connected with the regulation of commerce and will prevent so many frauds where the
parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it
seems not likely to be drawn into question."').
51. NOEL, supra note 48, at 92.
52. Id.

53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States").
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impairing the obligation of contracts.5 Since bankruptcy involves the
discharge of debt, which necessarily impairs the obligation of contracts,
states are prohibited from enacting bankruptcy law." Both the Bankruptcy
and Obligation of Contracts clauses preserve the integrity of contracts and
thereby help to create a stable and uniform national economy.56
2. Bankruptcy Acts from Ratification to 1898
In spite of persistent calls to fulfill the congressional mandate to
"establish... uniform laws," Congress took more than a decade to create
the first national bankruptcy act." Even in the early attempts, the issue of
innocent transferees surfaced. For example, the proposed House of
Representatives version of the Bankruptcy Act of 1798 included a section
addressing fraudulent transfers and the rights of transferees.5 ' The Senate
rejected the provision and the final bill did not include it.59 When President

54. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. ("No State shall ... coin money; emit Bills of Credit;
make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any
Title of Nobility.").
55. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935) ("Under
the bankruptcy power Congress may discharge the debtor's personal obligation, because,
unlike the states, it is not prohibited from impairing the obligations of contracts.").
56. NOEL, supra note 48, at 92.
57. Id. at 124.
58. Id. at 128. The tenth section of the bill stated, "In case a bankrupt sold any of his
property, the assignees are empowered to demand back such property, on payment of the
purchase money." Id. This would essentially be rescission of the transfer by the bankruptcy
estate. The proposed act required that the transferee receive back the payment given even
though the English bankruptcy system, on which the bill was based, considered any transfer
of property by the debtor in the six months prior to bankruptcy as presumed collusion. Id.
The English system valued uniformity and was willing to occasionally sacrifice justice for
individuals for the "greater good." Id. The American proposal, however, required the
bankruptcy estate to repurchase the property at a "fair price." Id. at 129. Another proposed
amendment to the 1798 bill would have allowed a transferee to additionally petition the
court to recover the entire amount expended for any improvements or accretions on the
land, in addition to the purchase price. Id.
59. Id. A proposed Senate amendment provided "[t]hat in case of a bonafide purchase,
made before the issuing of the commission from or under such bankrupt, for a valuable
consideration, by any person having no knowledge, information, or notice, of any act of
bankruptcy committed, such purchase shall not be invalidated, or impeached." Id. (emphasis
added). A subjective standard (actual knowledge, information, or notice) would have applied
to the transferee of a bona fide (good faith) purchase. This amendment was also excluded
from the final bill. Id.
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Adams signed the bill into law in 1800, it had a five-year term,"o but
Congress repealed it after only three years.'
For almost forty years, the United States had no national bankruptcy
laws.62 During that time period, bankruptcy was handled by the states,
which often passed statutes that dealt more leniently with debtors than had
the previous federal statutes.63 Although a bankruptcy act was barely passed
in 1841, it was repealed a mere eighteen months later.'
During the Civil War era, southern states threatened the stability of
interstate commerce by cancelling debts owed by their state citizens to
northern creditors.6' Realizing once again the need for a national
bankruptcy law, Congress passed one in 1867, which was signed by
President Johnson." This comprehensive act featured fifty sections
organized under headings, one of which was "Preferences and Fraudulent
Conveyances Declared Void."67 The Act was amended six times and finally
repealed altogether in 1878.68 Twenty years later, a comprehensive

60. Id. at 130.
61. NORTON, supra note 44, § 1:5. One reason for the repeal may have been the dramatic
shift in power from the Federalists under Presidents Washington and Adams to the AntiFederalists under President Jefferson.
62. Id.
63. Id. Because of the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts (see
supra note 54 and accompanying text), states could not discharge a debtor's debts without
the consent of the creditors. The states could, however, eliminate remedies available to
creditors under insolvency laws. For an analysis of the interplay between bankruptcy laws
and insolvency laws, see generally Adams v. Storey, 1 F. Cas. 141, 142-49 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1817).
64. NOEL, supra note 48, at 138. The vote was 26 to 23 in the Senate and 110 tol06 in the
House of Representatives. Id. at 138 n.13. The 1841 act allowed, for the first time, debtors to
initiate voluntary bankruptcy and opened bankruptcy to debtors of all occupations, not just
merchants. NORTON, supra note 44, § 1:5. The Act maintained the provision that a majority
of creditors could block discharge of the debtor's debts. Id.
65. NOEL, supra note 48, at 145-47. The tension increased as assets in the south were
destroyed by the war, leaving little collateral for debts. By 1863, the liabilities on southern
debt exceeded the asset values of the collateral by over $750 billion. Id. at 147. The loss in
value caused bankruptcy for both debtors in the south and creditors in the north. Id.
66. Id. at 153.
67. NORTON, supra note 44, § 1:6. Although the consent of a majority of creditors was
required for discharge, a creditor could not veto discharge if he received a statutorily set
minimum payment. Debtors could initiate the proceedings and receive a direct discharge of
debt. Id.
68. Id.
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bankruptcy code, which is the basis for the modern code, was approved.'9
Unlike its predecessors, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 directly addressed the
issue of innocent transferees. The Bankruptcy Act contained a provision
allowing avoidance of transfers made "with the intent and purpose on [the
debtor's] part to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors" except from
"purchasers in good faith and for a present fair consideration.""0
Before the Bankruptcy Act was enacted, state law governed fraudulent
transfers. State courts relied on the English common law, especially the
statutes of Elizabeth, which were incorporated as specific legislation or
through reception statutes.' England promulgated the statutes of Elizabeth
to combat the problem of fraudulent transfers that defrauded creditors and
purchasers.72 Significantly, under both the statutes of Elizabeth and
American application of the statutes, a transfer was not voidable if the
transferee paid fair value without knowledge of the fraud. 73 Even after the
Bankruptcy Act was passed in 1898, courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, continued to refer to the statutes of Elizabeth."

69. Id. at § 1:7.
70. In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 444 B.R. 767, 804 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (quoting
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 67e).
71. See, e.g., Bennett v. Ellison, 23 Minn. 242, 247 (1876) ("The validity of this
assignment must be tried by the laws of the state- i. e., by the common law as affirmed by the
statutes of Elizabeth-since there is no statute of the state relating to transfers of personal
property made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors."); Tubb v. Williams, 26
Tenn. 367, 371 (1846) ("The statutes of Elizabeth, and our act of 1801, enable the creditor to
subject the specific property, fraudulently conveyed while in the hands of the fraudulent
donee or vendee, to the satisfaction of his claim, but they do not enable him to claim the
proceeds of such property.").
72. Clayborn v. Hill, 1 Va. 177, 183 (1793) ("This inconvenience produced the Statutes
of Elizabeth respecting fraudulent conveyances. The preamble recites the mischief which
resulted from the possession remaining in one person, whilst the property was transferred to
another, whereby creditors, and purchasers, were defrauded; and the Judges stretched as far
as they well could, to carry this Statute into full effect."). The "mischief' cited here, that of
debtors "selling" property but remaining in possession, matches the first paradigm of
fraudulent transfer under an analysis of modern statutes, which is discussed infra at Part
II.B.4.c.
73. Grumbles v. Sneed, 22 Tex. 565, 577 (1858) (noting "the settled American doctrine"
that "a bona fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration, is protected under the statutes of 13
and 27 Elizabeth, as adopted in this country, whether he purchases from a fraudulent
grantor, or a fraudulent grantee").
74. See, for example, Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223 (1909), where the Court observed that
the phrase "hinder, delay, or defraud creditors" "was used at the common law, and in the
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Twenty years after the Bankruptcy Act was passed, the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) was proposed to abrogate common
law provisions and create uniformity between the Bankruptcy Act and the
fraudulent transfer statutes in the various states." UFCA's purpose was to
provide a uniform treatment of fraudulent transfers under non-bankruptcy
state statutes in order to facilitate interstate commerce."6 Fraudulent
transfer avoidance under the common law required a creditor to prove that
the transfer was made with actual intent on the part of the debtor to
"hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors." Because subjective intent is often
difficult to prove, state courts developed circumstantial indicators, called
badges of fraud, by which they could infer actual intent." The UFCA
attempted to unify the disparate badges of fraud and to make them more
objective."
The Chandler Act, passed by Congress in 1938, "modernized" the
Bankruptcy Act.o The actual fraud component stayed almost the same,
merely substituting a "bona fide" purchaser paying "present fair equivalent
value" for "purchasers in good faith and for a present fair consideration.""
More importantly, the Chandler Act added "constructive fraud as an
alternative means for avoiding transfers under that section."82 Under the
actual fraud provision, the consideration paid was an indicator of good
faith, and the test for good faith was "the extent to which [the transferee]
was implicated in the debtor's plan, first to get the money and then to put it

statute of Elizabeth" and held that Congress intended the phase as used in the Bankruptcy
Act to have its common law meaning. Id. at 242. Coder is discussed infra at Part II.B.1.a.
75.

Fraudulent Transfer Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION: THE NATIONAL

CONFERENCE

OF

COMMISSIONERS

ON

UNIFORM

STATE

LAWS,

http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Fraudulent%2OTransfer%2OAct (last visited
Dec. 21, 2012). The UFCA especially sought to abrogate statute 13 Elizabeth, which dealt
with fraudulent transfers. Id.
76. Paul Sinclair, supra note 28, at 16.
77. See, e.g., Bennett v. Ellison, 23 Minn. 242, 247 (1876) ("The validity of this
assignment must be tried by the laws of the state- i. e., by the common law as affirmed by the
statutes of Elizabeth-since there is no statute of the state relating to transfers of personal
property made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.").
78. Sinclair, supra note 28, at 16.
79. Id. at 16. The UFCA's badges of fraud became the basis of the modern fraudulent
transfer statute. Id. See also infra note 187 (quoting § 548).
80. NORTON, supra note 44, § 1:7.

81. In reTeleservices Grp., Inc., 444 B.R. 767, 804 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
82. Id.
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beyond the reach of creditors."" The constructive fraud provision followed
the UFCA in providing "badges of fraud" as objective markers of fraudulent
intent rather than leaving courts to infer intent from varied circumstances.8
So long as the transfer was for equivalent value, the debtor's estate was not
diminished and the transfer could not be avoided, regardless of the motives
of the debtor or the transferee." Under the constructive fraud provision a
transfer could be avoided, however, if the objective badges of fraud were
present-namely if the debtor was insolvent and the transferee gave less
than equivalent value-regardless of the innocence of the parties. 6
Therefore, Congress also added a new defense for innocent transferees who
gave less than equivalent value. Instead of using the term "good faith,"
however, Congress provided the defense for transferees who acted without
"actual fraudulent intent."" Just as Congress changed other words to close
equivalents in its modernization of the Act,"9 Congress likely viewed
"without actual fraudulent intent" as a synonym for "good faith."
During the seventy-year period following the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Act, major social, economic, and technological changes
occurred in the nation. Transportation changed from horse and buggy to jet
airplanes.90 The economy changed from an agrarian one to a predominantly
industrial one." Two significant changes signaled the critical need for
bankruptcy reform. First, consumer credit became a significant force in the
economy.92 Second, the Uniform Commercial Code began to create a
uniform business environment that required a uniform bankruptcy
process."
83. 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 259 (William S.
Hein & Co, Inc. ed. 2001) (1940). The deviation in some modern courts from this subjective
definition of good faith is discussed infra at Part III.C.
84. Sinclair, supra note 28, at 77.
85. GLENN, supra note 83, § 300. See Part II.B.2.
86. Teleservices Grp., 444 B.R. at 805-806.
87. Id.
88. Id. The significance of these changes is discussed infra at Part III.C.2.a.
89. For example, Congress substituted "bona fide" for "good faith" and "present fair
equivalent value" for "present fair consideration." Id. at 804.
90. NORTON, supra note 44, § 2: 1
91. Id.
92. Id. During a twenty-year period from 1950 to 1970, the number of bankruptcies
increased by 1000%. Id. §2:2.
93. Id. § 2:1. The drafters of the Constitution included the Bankruptcy Clause so that
Congress could facilitate the free flow of interstate commerce. See supra Part II.A.1.
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Congress responded by passing the Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1978,
which became known as the Bankruptcy Code. 4 The Code as amended"' is
the current national bankruptcy law. The current fraudulent transfer statute
is codified as 11 U.S.C. § 548.6 The UFCA was also revised, creating the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA)."

B. Well-EstablishedPrinciplesof FraudulentTransferDoctrine
From the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act in 1898 to its abrogation by
the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the principles of fraudulent transfer
remained fairly constant. Early cases and commentators laid the foundation
upon which modern analysis is built.
1. United States Supreme Court Opinions

a. Coder v. Arts
Preferences and fraudulent transfers are fundamentally different. As
early as 1909, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the distinction
between the two in Coder v. Arts." "A consideration of the provisions of the
bankruptcy law as to preferences and [fraudulent] conveyances shows that
there is a wide difference between the two, notwithstanding they are
sometimes spoken of in such a way as to confuse the one with the other."99
94. NORTON, supra note 44, § 2:3. The Bankruptcy Code is codified as Title 11 of the
U.S.C.
95. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 added a
subsection to the preference statute providing a $5000 safe harbor for non-consumer loan
payments and a new section requiring that any avoidance action for an amount under
$10,000 (and transferred to a non-insider) be filed in the district in which the transferee
resides. WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN & LAWRENCE R. AHERN III, 2005 BANKRUPTCY REFORM
LEGISLATION WITH ANALYSIS 2D 162-63 (2006).
96. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
97. Fraudulent Transfer Act Summary, Uniform Law Commission: The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, http://uniformlaws.org/
ActSummary.aspx?title=Fraudulent%20Transfer%2OAct (last visited 12/21/2012).
98. Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223 (1909).
99. Id. at 241. As discussed infra Part III.A.3., courts still "confuse the one with the
other." The Court was analyzing two sections of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. Section 60(b), the
precursor to the modern preference statute 11 U.S.C. § 547, states:
If a bankrupt shall have given a preference, and the person receiving it, or to be
benefited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall have had reasonable cause
to believe that it was intended thereby to give a preference, it shall be voidable
by the trustee, and he may recover the property or its value from such person.
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The Court stressed that "[i] n construing the bankruptcy act this distinction
[between preferences and fraudulent conveyances] must be kept constantly
in mind.""oo "An attempt to prefer is not to be confounded with an attempt
to defraud, nor a preferential transfer with a fraudulent one."'0 ' The Court
further reasoned,
The mere fact that one creditor was preferred over another, or
that the conveyance might have the effect to secure one creditor
and deprive others of the means of obtaining payment, was not
sufficient to avoid a conveyance; but it was uniformly recognized
that, acting in good faith, a debtor might thus prefer one or more

creditors. 10 2
Along with the emphasis on distinguishing between preferences and
fraudulent transfers, the Court also analyzed the good faith affirmative
defense, the precursor to the modern § 548(c).'03 Under the Bankruptcy Act,
a transfer "to purchasers in good faith and for a present fair consideration"
could not be voided even if "they have been made by the bankrupt with the
intent on his part to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors."" Further,
"[t] he question as to whether a transfer is made with intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud depends upon whether the act done is a bona fide [good faith]
transaction."' The Court's rationale suggests that even though "intent"
Id. at 239-40. Section 67(e), the precursor to § 548(a)(1)(A), states:
That all conveyances, transfers, assignments, or encumbrances of his
property, or any part thereof, made or given by a person adjudged a
bankrupt under the provisions of this act ... with the intent and purpose
on his part to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors,or any of them, shall
be null and void as against the creditors of such debtor, except as to
purchasers in good faith and for a present fair consideration; and all
property of the debtor conveyed, transferred, assigned, or encumbered as
aforesaid shall, if he be adjudged a bankrupt, and the same is not exempt
from execution and liability for debts by the law of his domicil, be and
remain a part of the assets and estate of the bankrupt, and shall pass to
his said trustee, whose duty it shall be to recover and reclaim the same by
legal proceedings or otherwise for the benefit of the creditors.
Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 241.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 242.
103. See note 193 and accompanying text.
104. Coder, 213 U.S. at 241-42.
105. Id. at 244.
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relates only to the debtor and "good faith" relates only to the transferee, a
nexus exists between the two."' 6
In summary, in Coder, the Court established the principle that a
preference is distinct from a fraudulent transfer. A fraudulent transfer is not
avoidable merely because it prefers one creditor over another. In addition, a
transfer made in good faith for fair consideration is not avoidable even if
the debtor had actual intent to defraud creditors.
b.

Van Iderstinev. NationalDiscount Co.

Four years after Coder, the Court revisited the fraudulent transfer issue
in Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co."'7 The insolvent debtor borrowed
money from a bank, using his business accounts as collateral.'o The bank
made two loans to the debtor even though it knew that the debtor was
insolvent and was purportedly using the loan proceeds to pay creditors who
were overdue.' 9 When petition for bankruptcy was filed, the bankruptcy
trustee sought both to have the transfer of the business accounts set aside
and to have the collections that the bank had made on those accounts
returned to the estate."' The district judge instructed the jury that a
preference was just as voidable as if the debtor "had concealed the money
from his creditors.""' The jury found in favor of the trustee." 2 The appeals
court reversed and the Supreme Court affirmed."' The Court rejected the
trustee's argument that using company assets, specifically the accounts, to
gain loans to pay existing debt should be treated as a fraudulent transfer."'
Instead, the Court delivered a densely packed statement of fraudulent
transfer principles.
Conveyances may be fraudulent because the debtor intends to put
the property and its proceeds beyond the reach of his creditors; or
because he intends to hinder and delay them as a class; or by
preferring one who is favored above the others. There is no
106. The relationship between the debtor's intent and transferee's good faith is analyzed
infra at Part III.C.2.
107. Van Iderstine v. Nat'l Disc. Co., 227 U.S. 575 (1913).
108. Id. at 580.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 580-81.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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necessary connection between the intent to defraud and that to
prefer, but in asmuch as one of the common incidents of a
fraudulent conveyance is the purpose on the part of the grantor
to apply the proceeds in such manner as to prefer his family or
business connections, the existence of such intent to prefer is an
important matter to be considered in determining whether there
was also one to defraud. But the two purposes are not of the same
quality, either in conscience or in law, and one may exist without
the other. The statute recognizes the difference between the intent
to defraud and the intent to prefer, and also the difference between
a fraudulent and a preferentialconveyance. One is inherently and
always vicious; the other innocent and valid, except when made in
violation of the express provisions of a statute. One is malum per
se and the other malum prohibitum,-and then only to the extent
that it isforbidden. A fraudulent conveyance is void regardless of
its date; a preference is valid unless made within the prohibited
period. It is therefore not in itself unlawful to prefer, nor
fraudulent for one, though insolvent, to borrow in order to use
the money in making a preference."s
First, the Court gives three examples of transfers that may be
fraudulent."' A transfer may be fraudulent when the intent of the debtor is
to put property out of the reach of creditors. This act can only be
accomplished if the transfer is to a non-creditor.Similarly, a transfer may be
fraudulent when the property is made less accessible to creditors as a class.
Again, the transfer must be to a non-creditor.The last example is a transfer
to a creditor who is preferred because he is a family or business connection.
These examples are relevant to an analysis of fraudulent transfers because
they highlight the relationship between the debtor's intent and the
transferee's status as a creditor. The receipt by a creditor of a legitimate
amount owed cannot be a fraudulent transfer unless there is a special
favored relationship between the debtor and the transferee."'
Second, the Court again emphasizes that preferences and fraudulent
transfers are "not of the same quality, either in conscience or in law.""' The
115. Id. at 582 (emphasis added).
116. These three categories roughly match the three paradigms put forth by Judge Breyer
in Boston TradingGroup, discussed infra at Part II.B.4.
117. The important implications of this principle in the context of Ponzi schemes are
discussed infra in Part III.A.
118. Van Iderstine, 227 U.S. at 582.
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Court expands on its Coder holding, which found preferences were related
to "policy,""1. and reasons that a preference is merely malum prohibitumnot wrong in and of itself but only wrong to the extent that it is forbidden
by statute. In contrast, a fraudulent transfer is malum in se-wrong because
it is wrong. The Court noted that the transfer to the bank could be set aside
only if the bank had known that the debtor intended both to pay some of its
creditors and to actually defraud others.'20 This knowledge would have
made the bank complicit in fraud, a malum in se act. Without such
knowledge, the transfer was not avoidable even though the debtor misused
the funds and the creditors were harmed.121
c.

Dean v. Davis

The Court reaffirmed its position a few years later in Dean v. Davis.122 In
that case, an insolvent debtor implored his brother-in-law, Dean, to loan
him money to pay creditors.' 23 Dean loaned the money in exchange for a
demand note secured by a mortgage on all the property the debtor
owned.124 Dean immediately foreclosed on the note.125 The Court affirmed
the lower court's findings that Dean had actual knowledge of the debtor's
plan to place all of his assets outside the reach of creditors by transferring
them to a relative.126 The Court supported a subjective standard for good
faith by noting that a mortgage by an insolvent debtor used to pay preexisting debt would not be fraudulent if made with the expectation that the
"debtor will extricate himself from a particular difficulty and be enabled to
promote the interest of all other creditors by continuing his business."127In
119. Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 241 (1909) ("In a preferential transfer the fraud is
constructive or technical, consisting in the infraction of that rule of equal distribution among
all creditors which it is the policy of the law to enforce when all cannot be fully paid.").
120. Van Iderstine, 227 U.S. at 583.
121. Compare this to the very similar facts given by Professor Glenn. See infra notes 16368 and accompanying text. In Glenn's scenario, the loan is avoidable because the lender
knew the proceeds from the loan would be ill-used and the estate consequently diminished.
122. Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
123. Id. at 442.
124. Id.
125. Id. The demand note was executed September 10. It was recorded on September 11.
September 12 was a Sunday. Dean foreclosed on the note on September 13, destroying any
chance that other creditors could be paid. Id.
126. Id. at 445.
127. Id. at 444. "The lender who makes an advance for that purpose with full knowledge
of the facts may be acting in perfect 'good faith."' Id.
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contrast, the debtor in Dean must have known that mortgaging all of his
property to his brother-in-law for a demand note that had already matured
would result in the collapse of his business and bankruptcy.128 Dean's
immediate foreclosure of the note was sufficient to find complicity in the
fraud and deny Dean the good faith defense-even though Dean had given
"fair value" for the transfer. 129
The Court's holdings in Van Iderstine and Dean support a subjective,
actual knowledge standard for good faith. To lose the good faith defense,
the transferee must know of the debtor's intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors before the transaction, creating a virtual participation in the fraud.
The favored relationship between the debtor and the transferee is
important. The debtor's creation of more debt to pay off some creditors,
even while knowingly insolvent, is not sufficient in itself to trigger the
fraudulent transfer statute."o
d. Cunningham v. Brown
Although the parties in Cunningham v. Brown'm' might be unfamiliar to
most people, the debtor in the case has become a household word: Ponzi. In
December 1919, Charles Ponzi convinced people to lend him money,
backed by unsecured notes, so that he could purchase international postal
coupons and sell them at a profit. 3 2 Ponzi promised to pay a 50% return on
the loan within ninety days.' Ponzi's consistent ability to make payments
of amounts owed induced others to invest with him. Six months later,
Ponzi's scheme was bringing in about $1 million a week.'34 On August 2, a
newspaper published a report that Ponzi's selling of notes was being
investigated.'35 The news led to a "wild scramble" by Ponzi's investors
seeking to cash in their notes. 3 6 Ponzi shifted money from his accounts in

128. Id. at 445.
129. Id.
130. The failure of some modern courts to follow the Court's rationale in Coder, Van
Iderstine,and Dean is discussed infra at Parts III.A and C.
131. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924). Henry Cunningham was appointed
trustee after all the other trustees had died pending litigation. Id. at 7. Benjamin Brown, a
minor at the time of the fraud, was one of five named defendants in the case. Id.

132. Id.
133. Id.
134.

Id. at 8.

135. Id.
136. Id.
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other banks to one in Boston to cover the redemptions, but, by August 9,
Ponzi's bank account was empty."'
The Ponzi case dealt exclusively with preferences."' Under the
Bankruptcy Act, a preference was voidable if made during the preference
period and if the transferee knew that his payment would be a
preference'"-"that is, that the effect of the payment will be to enable him
to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than others of the creditors of the
insolvent of the same class."o The Court noted that, on August 2, there
began a "scramble and a race" by a crowd of people who "struggled" for
eight days to get their money."' "Thus they came into the teeth of the
Bankruptcy Act, and their preferences in payment are avoided by it." 4 2 The
Court reasoned that all investors who had received payments within the
prescribed preference period were subject to the preference statute."' The
Court concluded that the case called "strongly for the principle that equality
is equity, and this is the spirit of the bankrupt law. Those who were
successful in the race of diligence violated not only its spirit, but its letter,
and secured an unlawful preference."'"
The Court's holding in the first Ponzi case is now largely apposite to
litigation that surrounds modern Ponzi schemes. The trustee in
Cunninghamwas seeking to avoid only preferences. The trustee's avoidance
strategy was proper because each investor victim was a creditor of Ponzi
137. Id.
138. The specific question was whether investors who had redeemed when they learned
of an investigation of Ponzi were seeking a preference. Id. at 9. The trial court ruled and the
appeals court affirmed that those who scrambled to withdraw their money between August 2
and the collapse had rescinded the transaction and were thereby a separate class of creditors.
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that there was no evidence that the investors had
rescinded for fraud rather than merely cashing in the investment early. Id. Under the current
Bankruptcy Code, all payments within the preference period are avoidable regardless of the
transferee's knowledge of a preference. See infra note 174. Significantly, the trustee sought
avoidance of no fraudulent transfers.
139. Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 10. The preference period under the Bankruptcy Act was
four months, while the preference period under the Bankruptcy Code is ninety days. See
infra note 174. Under the Bankruptcy Act, a preference was avoidable only if the transferee
had knowledge of the preference. That requirement was removed from the Bankruptcy
Code. Id.
140. Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 10.
141. Id. at 10-11.
142. Id. at 11.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 13.
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and had received a transfer during the preference period. In contrast, the
litigation today centers around a trustee's attempt to avoid transfers under
the fraudulent transfer doctrine. As the Coder Court noted, preferences and
fraudulent transfers are separate doctrines that should not be confused.14 1
Preference doctrine does indeed have as its spirit equality of distribution.
Notwithstanding the tendency of courts to apply Cunningham to fraudulent
transfers, Cunningham applies to preferences only.
2.

The Glenn Treatise

In 1940, two years after the Chandler Act "modernized" the Bankruptcy
Act,' Garrard Glenn published his classic treatise, FraudulentConveyances
14
and Preferences.
Modern courts still quote Glenn's scholarly work.14 1
Analysis of fraudulent transfers and preferences under the Bankruptcy Act
is relevant because the Bankruptcy Code is founded on the Act and the
Supreme Court has emphasized that lower courts should interpret the Code
in a manner consistent with the Act unless Congress has expressly indicated
otherwise.14 Glenn notes that a transferee who gives equivalent value to the
debtor in exchange for the property transferred is immune from a
fraudulent transfer claim because the creditors, "hav[ing] no trust interest
in any particular asset," are not in any worse position than if the transfer
had not been made.! Of singular importance is the effect the transfer has
on the estate. "Where a transfer ...

is put forward as a fraudulent

conveyance, the test is whether, as a result of the transaction, the debtor's
estate was unfairly diminished ... [A]n essential feature of the fraudulent
conveyance is depletion of the debtor's estate."'
An estate is not
diminished if the debtor receives "fair consideration" for the transfer, which
145. Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 241 (1909).
146. NoRTON, supra note 44, § 2:1.
147. GLENN, supra note 83.
148. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 44 (1989) (quoting Glenn as
"scholarly authority"); In re Abatement Envtl. Res., Inc., 102 F. App'x 272, 279 (4th Cir.
2004) ("In analyzing fraudulent conveyances, Professor Glenn wrote of whether a transfer
was for value that 'the test is whether, as a result of the transaction, the debtor's estate was
unfairly diminished.'" (quoting GLENN, supra note 83, § 275)).
149. See In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 444 B.R. 767, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (noting
that the United States Supreme Court "instructs the lower courts again and again to interpret
the current Code in a manner that is consistent with prior bankruptcy practice unless
Congress has expressly indicated a different intent") (collecting cases).
150. GLENN, supra note 83, § 235.
151. Id.§275.
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may be an exchange of property or satisfaction of an antecedent debt.152 put
succinctly, "So long as the transfer does not diminish the estate, the motives
of debtor and grantee are immaterial.""
The transferee who fails to give fully equivalent value is still protected
from a fraudulent transfer claim if the transferee has "given value" in "good
faith." 154 "Good faith" means the transferee "had no knowledge or notice of
the debtor's intent" to defraud creditors-a subjective standard.' The test
for good faith is closely linked with the value given because inadequacy of
consideration would tend to show that the transferee knew that "he was not
trading normally" and the debtor's purpose might be to defraud creditors.156
If the transferee failed to pay equivalent value and had "knowledge of the
debtor's purpose, or if what he did know was enough to put him on his
inquiry," then he may be liable for the transfer.' In summary, a transferee's
"good faith is tested by the extent to which he was implicated in the debtor's
plan, first to get the money and then to put it beyond the reach of
creditors."' 5
Glenn discussed a fraudulent type of scheme that has similarities to
modern Ponzi schemes. He outlined a scenario whereby a debtor obtains a
loan for which substantially all of his property is collateral."'5 The debtor
uses the loan proceeds to pay off outstanding credit accounts, thereby
creating a false impression of solvency, with the purpose of inducing others
to supply even more goods on credit.'60 The new goods are sold, usually at a
discount, and the debtor "makes away with the money."' 6 1 The creditors
then discover that all of the debtor's property is tied up as collateral for the
loan and therefore unavailable to satisfy the debts. 62 The lender, who is not
152. Id. 293.
153. Id. 5 300. For a discussion of how modern courts have deviated from this clear
principle, see infra Part II.C.
154. Id. § 294.
155. Id.
156. Id. § 295 ("The question is solely whether the grantee knew, or should have known,
that he was not trading normally, that on the contrary, the purpose of the trade, so far as the
debtor was concerned, was the defrauding of his creditors.").
157. Id. § 300.
158. Id. § 259. The deviation in some modern courts from this subjective definition of
good faith is discussed infra at Part III.C.
159. Id. § 303.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. This is the scenario presented in Dean v. Davis discussed infra at Part II.B.1.
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a creditor himself, forfeits the collateral if he makes the loan knowing that
the debtor intends to defraud creditors.'63 "The extension of credit is
induced by deceitful practices which the grantee's loan makes possible; and
the grantee who cooperates in such a purpose must give up his collateral,
inasmuch as the loan was a direct cause of creditors being defrauded.""
The complicit transferee must return the collateral, even if he gave the
debtor "fair value" in the form of the loan, because he knew the debtor
would "make away with" both the loan money and the money from the sale
of the goods bought on credit. As a result, the estate is diminished. Having
failed the "good faith" exception, the transferee will lose both the money
transferred to the debtor and the collateral received from the debtor.
Significantly, this forfeiture applies only when the transferee either actually
knows of the intended fraud, and thereby participates in the scheme, or he
"chooses to remain ignorant," "conscious[ly] turning away from"
knowledge of the fraud at the time of the transfer.'6 s "There must, indeed,
be more than negligence."'" A transferee who is negligent in inquiring into
potential fraud of the debtor is still protected, but a willfully ignorant

transferee is not.167
3. The Interplay Between Various Code Provisions
Congress placed the statutes dealing with fraudulent and preferential
transfers in Chapter 5, subchapter III of the Code, which is entitled "The
Estate."'*6 The position of the statutes indicates a legal rather than equitable
question: whether the property at issue is part of the bankruptcy estate.
Section 541161 is the first section under subchapter III and lists property that

163. GLENN, supra note 83, § 303.

164. Id.
165. Id. § 304. A key argument for the presumption that all transfers in the context of a
Ponzi scheme are fraudulent, discussed in depth infra at Part III.A, is that the payments from
the perpetrator to some Ponzi investors makes it possible to induce new victims to sign on.
Bankruptcy trustees use this similarity to justify taking back money paid by Ponzi debtors to
victims. Further, trustees can often use a "Ponzi presumption" to avoid having to prove
complicity on the part of the transferee. See infra Part III.B.
166. GLENN, supra note 83, § 304.
167. The distinction between negligence and willful ignorance should be taken into
account when analyzing "inquiry notice" and "good faith." These issues are discussed infra at
Part III.C.
168. The Bankruptcy Act is codified as Title 11 of the United States Code. Chapter 5
covers "Creditors, the Debtor and the Estate."
169. Section 541 says in relevant part:
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is part of the estate and property that is not.' Included in the estate is "any
interest in property that the trustee recovers under section ... 550 .. . of this
title.""' Section 550"' authorizes the bankruptcy trustee to "recover, for the
benefit of the estate, the property transferred" if the trustee successfully
avoids the transfer under § 547 or § 548.173 In summary, a bankruptcy
trustee may seek to avoid a transfer under § 547 or § 548 and then claw back
the transferred property using § 550 for the estate created under § 541.
Although the trustee can recover the transferred property for the estate,
nothing in the statute requires the estate to return to the transferee the value
of the property received by the debtor in the exchange.

(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property,
wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section ...
550 . .. of this title....

11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Section 550 says in relevant part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is
avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the
trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if
the court so orders, the value of such property, from(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit
such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
(b) The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section from(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a
present or antecedent debt, in good faith, and without knowledge of the
voidability of the transfer avoided; or
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such transferee.
11 U.S.C. § 550 (2006).
173. § 550(a). Sections 544, 545, 549, 553(b), and 724(a) deal with liens and transfers
outside the scope of this Comment. This Comment focuses on sections 547 and 548 only.
The relevant text of sections 547 and 548 are printed infra at notes 174 and 183, respectively.
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Preferences

Section 547,7 entitled "Preferences," grants the trustee power to avoid

preferential transfers.'7 1 In order to qualify as a preferential transfer, the
transfer must be of "an interest of the debtor in property," to a creditor for a
debt already owed, made while the debtor was insolvent, and made "on or
within 90 days before the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition
... .""6 Thus, preferences are payments by the debtor for debts he
legitimately owes. Significantly, the window of voidability is very shortonly ninety days. 77
"Preferential transfer law has as its chief concern distributional
equality."78 Section 547 has no good faith defense. It has no fraud

174. Section 547 says in relevant part:
(b) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (i) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider
11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006).
175. Id.
176. Id. Subsection 547(c) bars the trustee from avoiding certain transfers, including a
transfer that was either "(A) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of
the debtor and the transferee; or (B) made according to ordinary business terms."
§ 547(c)(2). Some courts have dismissed the defense in the context of Ponzi schemes,
holding that no payment in a Ponzi scheme can be considered in the ordinary course of
business because businesses do not ordinarily defraud clients. See, e.g., Matter of Bishop,
Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc., 819 F.2d 214, 216 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the
transferee's defense and holding that transfers pursuant to a Ponzi scheme are not in the
ordinary course of business of the debtor). Nevertheless, the plain text suggests that if a
transfer was ordinary in the relationship between the debtor and transferee, as consistent
payments from the debtor to Ponzi scheme victims would be, then such a transfer would not
be avoidable as a preference. The transfer would still be subject to avoidance as a fraudulent
transfer under section 548. Discussion of this line of defense is outside the scope of this
Comment.
177. § 547(b)(4)(A).

178. In re Carrozzella & Richardson (Daly v. Parete), 270 B.R. 92, 99 (Bankr. D. Conn.
2001).
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requirement.17 9 Except for a few defenses,'s § 547 allows avoidance of all
transfers made within the preference period. Preferences are malum
prohibitum-"innocent and valid, except when made in violation of the
express provisions of a statute.""' Section 547 expressly allows the trustee to
claw back "innocent and valid" payments by the debtor of debts already
owed to the creditors. 8 2 The statute harms some innocent creditors to
benefit other similarly situated creditors-distributional equality. But
Congress limited the infliction of avoidance on innocent creditors to a
ninety-day window.
b. Fraudulent transfers
In contrast to avoidance of antecedent debt payments under § 547, the
bankruptcy trustee may avoid transfers under § 548'1 only if the transfers
179. In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 444 B.R. 767, 802 (W.D. Mich. 2011) ("[T]he debtor's
intent is completely irrelevant to whether a transfer is avoided under Section 547(b) as a
preference.").
180. See § 547(c) (barring the trustee from avoiding certain transfers, including a transfer
that was either "(A) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor
and the transferee; or (B) made according to ordinary business terms").
181. Van Iderstine v. Nat'l Disc. Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913).
182. As an example, suppose, as is likely, that Debtor was insolvent during the ninety
days preceding the filing for bankruptcy and that Debtor paid his credit card bill, his lease
payments, and his supply expenses. The bankruptcy trustee may avoid all of those payments
under section 547 and require the credit card company, landlord, and supply company to
return the payments received to the debtor's estate pursuant to section 550, unless a 547(c)
defense applies.
183. Section 548(a) says, in relevant part:
(a)(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer ... of an interest of the debtor in
property, or any obligation ... incurred by the debtor, that was made or
incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the
debtor voluntarily or involuntarily(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to
hinder,delay, or defraudany entity to which the debtor was or became, on
or after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was
incurred, indebted; or
(B)(i) received less than a reasonablyequivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation;
(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to
engage in business or a transaction, for which any property
remaining with the debtor was an unreasonablysmall capital;
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were "fraudulent."'" In contrast to the short ninety-day window for
preferences, fraudulent transfers may be avoided if they are made up to two
years before the filing of bankruptcy.'" Fraudulent transfers may be
"actually" or "constructively" fraudulent.'" Actual fraud requires that the
debtor made the transfer with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
entity to which the debtor was ... indebted."'87 Actual intent requires a
subjective standard of proof, which may be hard to meet.'18 Subsection
548(a)(1)(B) provides an objective basis for avoiding fraudulent transfers.'
Under subsection (B), a transfer is constructively fraudulent if the debtor
"received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange" for the
transfer and was either insolvent, had unreasonably small capital, could not
pay debts as they became due, or transferred the property to an insider.'
Actual fraud requires intent, but constructive fraud does not. If the
debtor had actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor, then the
entire transfer is voidable by the trustee."' In contrast, a constructively
(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur,
debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts
matured; or
(IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or
incurred such obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, under
an employment contract and not in the ordinary course of
business.
11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006) (emphasis added).

184. Id.

185. § 548(a)(1).
186. Boston Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1509 (1st Cir. 1987).

187. § 548(a)(1)(A).
188. "Badges of fraud" developed as indicators from which actual fraud could be inferred.
Historically, the primary badge of fraud was a relationship between the debtor and the
transferee "more than a business acquaintanceship and further than friendship." GLENN,
supra note 83, § 307.
189. A constructive fraud subsection was first added to the Bankruptcy Act in 1938 as
part of the Chandler Act. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. The constructive
fraud subsection became § 548(a)(1)(B) in the modern code. See supra note 183.
190. § 548(a)(1)(B).
191. § 548(a)(1)(A). For example, suppose that two years before filing for bankruptcy,
Debtor purchased a truck from Transferee for $4000, but the truck had a fair market value of
only $2000. If Debtor's intent was to, delay, or defraud creditors from being paid, then the
bankruptcy trustee may avoid the transfer under section 548(a)(1)(A). Typical methods of
hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors include transfer of the title only with the debtor
retaining possession; the debtor giving exceptional deals to friends and family; and the
debtor shifting money from liquid to illiquid assets. See discussion infra Part II.B.4.c. Once
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fraudulent transfer may be avoided only if the debtor did not receive
reasonably equivalent value, regardless of intent.19 2
c. Good faith defense
In either actually or constructively fraudulent transfers, the potential for
innocent transferees to suffer loss is significant. If a transfer is otherwise
avoidable under § 548, a transferee's best, and possibly only, defense is
§ 548(c).' A transferee who "takes for value and in good faith... may
retain any interest transferred" to the extent of the value given.114 The
Bankruptcy Act had contained two good faith defenses, one for those who
paid "present fair equivalent value" and one for those who, although acting
in good faith, paid less than fair value.'95 The Bankruptcy Code combined
both provisions into § 548(c). 6 In doing so, Congress replaced the terms
avoided, the trustee may claw back $4000 from Transferee under section 550, even if
Transferee gave Debtor the truck, had no knowledge of Debtor's intent to defraud creditors,
and had already spent the money two years ago. If Debtor still has the truck, it will be
liquidated to pay creditors; Transferee does not receive it back.
On the other hand, suppose Debtor purchased the $4000 truck but had no intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. For example, Debtor may have merely been mistaken as
to the fair market value of the truck. The bankruptcy trustee cannot avoid the transfer under
the actual fraud subsection and must rely on the constructive fraud provision. If the court
finds that $4000 was not a "reasonably equivalent value" for the truck, the trustee has passed
the first prong of the constructive fraud test. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i). The trustee
must still satisfy the second prong by proving that, at the time of the transfer, either Debtor
was insolvent, Debtor's business was undercapitalized, Debtor was not able to make
payments to creditors as they became due, or Transferee was "an insider." 11 U.S.C. § 548
(a)(1)(B)(ii). If the bankruptcy trustee proves both prongs of the test, he may then use
section 550 to claw back $4000 for the estate.
192. § 548(a)(1)(B).
193. Section 548(c) says in relevant part:
(c) Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this section
is voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of
such a transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good faith has a lien on
or may retain any interest transferredor may enforce any obligation incurred,
as the case may be, to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the
debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation.
11 U.S.C. § 548 (emphasis added). Section 550(b) provides an additional defense for
subsequent transferees.See discussion infra Part III.C.2.b.
194. In the example supra note 191, even if the bankruptcy trustee successfully avoids the
$4000 payment, the trustee will only be able to recover $2000 ($4000 less the value of the
truck) under section 550, but only if Transferee is found to have acted in "good faith."
195. In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 444 B.R. 767, 804 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
196. Id. at 806.
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"bona fide" and "without actual fraudulent intent" with the single term
"good faith."' It is reasonable to assume, then, that Congress considered
the terms synonymous.
In the UFCA, badges of fraud were intended to be objective, but the
standard for good faith was subjective. 98 The Bankruptcy Act provided that
transfers could be avoided if made with the intent and purpose to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors except as to purchasers in good faith and for a
present fair consideration 9 An analysis of the good-faith-for-value defense
considered value as an indicator of good faith; where full value was paid,
good faith was presumed.2 00 Prior to implementation of the Bankruptcy
Code, a landmark Washington State case, Tacoma Association of Credit
Men v. Lester,2"' elevated good faith beyond its narrow function by
requiring a three-part test. 2 02 Although the test was subjective, it shifted the
fraudulent transfer inquiry from whether the transaction was "normal" to
the subjective mental workings of the transferee.2 03
d. Special issues in Ponzi scheme cases
Ponzi scheme cases create difficulties for courts seeking to analyze
fraudulent transfer doctrine. Although the expectations of Ponzi investors
are the same as any other investor-a return on principal commensurate
with the risk of investment-in hindsight the investment often does not
exist. Therefore, there is no chance of a legitimate return on investment.2 04
All payments made to the investor victim are funds taken from other
197. Id.

198. Sinclair, supra note 28, at 16.
199. Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 240 (1909) (quoting section 67(e) of the Bankruptcy
Act, "That all conveyances, transfers, assignments, or encumbrances of his property, or any
part thereof, made or given by a person adjudged a bankrupt under the provisions of this act
... with the intent and purpose on his part to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or any
of them, shall be null and void as against the creditors of such debtor, except as to purchasers
in good faith and for a present fair consideration.").
200. See GLENN, supra note 83, § 300.
201. Tacoma Ass'n of Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d 453, 433 P.2d 901 (1967).
202. Sinclair, supra note 28, at 16. The court defined good faith as "(1) an honest belief in
the propriety of the activities in question, (2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of
others and (3) no intent or knowledge that the activities in question will hinder, delay or
defraud others." Id.
203. Id.

204. Alex S. Weiner, Comment, Net Equity Only Comes with Net Equality: An
Exploration of an Alternative Remedy for Victims of Ponzi Schemes, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 523,
526-27 (Winter 2012).
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investor victims. 205 In addition, because there are no assets that the
bankruptcy trustee can attach, the trustee increases the value of the estate
and also earns his own fees, primarily by recovering money paid out to
those who have been victimized.?
The trustee may seek to avoid transfers under both the actual fraud
theory and the constructive fraud theory. Under the actual fraud theory, the
entire amount paid to the transferee is avoidable, including "return of
principal."2 07 Most courts use an avoidability presumption that all transfers
made in a Ponzi scheme fall within the actually fraudulent provision.208
Section 548(c), however, permits an investor who can prove good faith to
keep the property received, up to the amount invested.2 09 The standard for
good faith becomes critical to the question of whether a Ponzi victim will
have to disgorge the return-of-principal payments.210
Under the constructive fraud theory, the trustee must prove both that the
estate did not receive equivalent value for the transfer and that the
transferee did not act in good faith.211 Courts have suggested that investors
give no value by investing their money in the scheme because the
"investment" underlying the Ponzi scheme is fictitious and payments
merely serve to induce new victims. 2 12 Nevertheless, courts have recognized
a tort claim for fraud for investors in fraudulent schemes, entitling them to
rescission of the transaction. 21 3 The debtor owes the investor her money
back. The rescission claim constitutes antecedent debt." Each payment
from the debtor to the transferee gives "reasonably equivalent value"
because it decreases the debtor's obligation to pay. 215 "Payments up to the
amount of the initial investment are considered to be exchanged for
'reasonably equivalent value,' and thus not fraudulent, because they
proportionally reduce the investors' rights to restitution."21 6 Once the
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 523.
Id. at 523-24.
Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762,771 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 770.
Id. at 771.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
See discussionsupra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
Kowell, 533 F.3d at 770.
Id. at 772.
Id.
Id. (quoting In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d 589, 595 (9th Cir. 1991)).
Id. (quoting In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d 589, 595 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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investor has received back an amount equivalent to her investment, she no
longer has a claim of rescission and she gives nothing of value in return for
the payment."' A "net-winner," one who has received back all her
principal, 2 1 8 is liable for return of fictitious profits. 21 9 A "net-loser," one who
has not received back all her principal,220 can defeat a constructive fraud
claim. 221 As a result, the trustee may only avoid "profits" above the amount
invested-unless the trustee can prove a lack of good faith.222 In that case,
the trustee can avoid and recover the entire amount paid to the transferee.22 3
Under the actual fraud theory, the victim must prove her good faith; under
the constructive fraud theory, the trustee must show the victim's lack of
good faith. 2 24 Either way, the amount clawed back from the victim rests on
the definition of good faith.
4. Boston TradingGroup-A Modern Exposition on Fraudulent
Transfer
Undoubtedly, Boston TradingGroup, Inc. v. Burnazos, Inc.225 is one of the
most instructive expositions on modern fraudulent transfer law. While
Coder, Van Iderstine, and Dean226 were adjudicated under the Bankruptcy
Act, Boston Trading Group was adjudicated under the modern
Massachusetts fraudulent transfer statute.2 27 Judge Stephen Breyer's 228
217. Id.
218. In re Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A., 464 B.R. 465, 467 n.6 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2012).
219. Kowell, 533 F.3d at 770.
220. Rothstein, 464 B.R. at 467 n.7.
221. Kowell, 533 F.3d at 771. In a long-term fraud, especially consisting of purported
investments in securities, investors may make dozens or hundreds of transfers with the
debtor. To simplify determination of whether an investor is liable to return funds, some
courts use a "netting rule." Id. Amounts received by the investor are "netted against the
initial amounts invested by that individual." Id. If the net is positive, the investor is a "netwinner" and must return the fictitious profits. If the net is negative, the investor is a "netloser." A "net-loser" is not safe, however, because the trustee can still seek to claw back what
the net-loser has received under the actual fraud statute. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Boston Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504 (1st Cir. 1987).
226. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
227. The suit against the transferee was initiated by a court-appointed receiver prior to
filing of bankruptcy. Boston TradingGrp., 835 F.2d at 1506. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code
statutes could not be used. Fraudulent transfer cases often involve both state and Code
statutes, especially where a trustee finds advantage in using the state statute. See, e.g., In re
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reasoning shows that the common law roots and traditional analysis of
fraudulent transfer principles remain valid today.229
a. The facts
Robert Burnazos bought for $200,000 Boston Trading Group, a company
that managed pools of money for commodities transactions. 2 30 Two years
later, Burnazos sold Boston Trading Group to Richard Shaw for $1.6
million.231 Burnazos had previously worked for the same company as Shaw
and was aware that customers complained that Shaw was dishonest.2 32 The
prior year, Shaw had founded his own investment company for the purpose
of defrauding customers.2 33 In connection with the purchase of Boston
Trading Group, Shaw gave Burnazos, as a down payment, $400,000 from
the funds dishonestly acquired from defrauded customers and gave
Burnazos a promissory note for the balance.234 Shortly thereafter, Shaw's
investment company closed, after its customers lost $3 million, and Shaw
siphoned money from Boston Trading Group customer accounts to make
the payments to Burnazos. 235 Burnazos sued Shaw, claiming that he was

Agric. Research and Tech. Grp. Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 534 (9th Cir. 1990) (using state statute's
longer avoidance period). Analysis of the requirements and terms under uniform state
statutes is applicable to the same provisions and terms in the Code. Id. ("Although the
Uniform Act and the common law thus provide the substantive law in this case, cases
construing the Bankruptcy Code counterparts are persuasive authority due to the similarity
of the laws in this area."); In re Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc., 174 B.R. 557, 572 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal.1994) ("Unless otherwise specified, common-law authorities and case-law dealing
with the UFCA, UFTA, Bankruptcy Act of 1898 or the Bankruptcy Code may be crossreferenced whatever the statutory basis of the action at bar.").
228. Judge Breyer was sitting on the First Circuit Court of Appeals when he wrote this
decision. He became a United States Supreme Court justice in 1994. Biographies of Current
Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last
visited Aug. 12, 2013).
229. Judge Breyer refers to the statutes of Elizabeth as the common law basis for the
Massachusetts fraudulent statute. Boston Trading Grp., 835 F.2d at 1505-06. He also cites
Gerrard Glenn's treatise on fraudulent transfers (see supra note 83) fifteen times. Id. at 1506,
1508, 1509, 1511, 1512, 1513, 1515.
230. Id. at 1506.
231. Id. Shaw had a partner, Theodore Kepreos. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. Shaw and Kepreos cheated their customers by making and charging commissions
for unnecessary trades, called "churning." Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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destroying both businesses, which were Burnazos's only security for
repayment of the note.236 At this point, Burnazos knew that payments made
to him were from funds defrauded from Shaw's investment clients.237
Burnazos and Shaw settled the suit, and Shaw paid Burnazos $400,000 with
certified checks drawn from Boston Trading Group customer accounts. 23 8
At the time of the payment, Burnazos knew the funds he received were from
defrauded clients.239 The following month, a federal district court appointed
a receiver, who subsequently sought to avoid the transfers and recover the
money for the estate. 2 ' A jury found, by special verdict, that Burnazos had
given fair consideration in good faith for the down payment of $400,000 but
not for the subsequent payments.24 1 The verdict was appealed.242
b. Fraudulent transfer, unlike restitution, is not an equitable
remedy
Judge Breyer begins his analysis with the distinction between equitable
and legal remedies. He notes that a person might think that the laws of
restitution fit just such a case as Boston Trading Group, but the person
would be wrong.23 An investment advisor's wrongful taking of client
money is embezzlement, and a transferee who receives such funds, knowing
the funds have been embezzled, will be required to return the money to the
original owners. 2 " Likewise, if a person, knowing money has been stolen,
takes that money from the thief, the person must return the money to the
victim even though the person has no fiduciary duty to the victim-and
therefore the victim has no legal claim against the transferee. 24 5 These are
"well-established principles of restitution." 246

236. Id.
237. Id.

238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. The receiver was requested by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
and the court gave the receiver power to prosecute all claims of equity on behalf of both
Boston Trading Group and Shaw's company. Id.
241. Id. at 1507.
242. Id.

243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1508.
Id.
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In contrast, the fraudulent transfer doctrine flows from law, not equity,
and is designed for a different purpose than restitution.247 Fraudulent
transfer law establishes a legal, not equitable, remedy whereby a creditor
may recover money disposed of by a debtor and held by a third party.24 8
This is accomplished by declaring the transfer void as a matter of law.
c.

Fraudulent transfer paradigms

Judge Breyer notes that an extensive review of cases and commentators
indicates that fraudulent transfers fall into "three basic paradigm
examples."2 49 Judge Breyer's paradigm examples generally reflect the
examples given by the Van Iderstine Court.25 0 The first, and most important,
paradigm is a debtor who transfers property to a transferee but expects to
retain the benefit of the property.25 1
In such a case, the debtor in effect lies to his creditors,
pretending he has no property left, when he really has some (in
the hands of his friend). The law calls this untruthful kind of
conveyance "fraudulent" and permits the creditor to void the
transfer and attach the property in order to satisfy his debt.2 52
This type of transfer was seen in Dean v. Davis, where the debtor gave all his
property as security for a note held by his brother-in-law. 25 3 As in Dean, the
transferee in this paradigm is a non-creditor.
The second paradigm involves a transfer by the debtor to a non-creditor
transferee in a "special relationship," like a friend or family member.2 54
Although the debtor does not expect to retain a benefit from the property,
"he simply prefers that the property go to a friend rather than to an enemy
or to a stranger.""' The creditor may recover from the transferee because
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Van Iderstine v. Nat'1 Disc. Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913). See supra text
accompanying notes 110-12.
251. Boston Trading Grp., 835 F.2d at 1508. This might happen when a debtor transfers
to a friend the title to property but retains possession. Id. Similarly, the debtor may give
money to a friend to hold for the debtor with the secret agreement that the friend will return
the money when the creditors give up. Id.
252. Id.
253. Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 442 (1917). See discussionsupra Part II.B.1.c.
254. Boston TradingGrp., 835 F.2d at 1508.
255. Id.
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the transfer violated the principle "be just before you are generous."25 This
paradigm resembles the second example, "preferring one who is favored
above the others," given by the Van Iderstine Court.257
Third, a debtor may exchange liquid assets, such as cash, for assets a
creditor will have difficulty in seizing, like a homestead. 25 8 This paradigm
resembles the third example given by the Van Iderstine Court. 259 "Even
though the conveyance is open, truthful, and not to a friend, it hinders
creditors in their efforts to satisfy their debts," and the creditor will be able
to void the transfer.260
In Boston Trading Group,261 Shaw transferred to Burnazos funds, likely
acquired through fraud or embezzlement, in payment of a contractual
business obligation. Nevertheless, the facts do not match any of the three
paradigms. 2 62 The transaction was open, not hidden. Burnazos had no
special relationshipwith Shaw. The exchange of cash was for payment of an
antecedent debt, a situation very different from an illiquid asset like a
homestead.2 63 While the paradigms are not "rules" and are not exclusive, "it
[is] significant . .. that this [case] does not resemble any of them." 2 64
Of even more significance, Judge Breyer notes, "The cases and the
commentators also state that fraudulent conveyance law does not seek to
2 65
void transfers in a fourth circumstance known as a 'preference."'
Suppose a debtor owes A $10,000 and B $20,000. He has only
$8000, which he uses to satisfy his debt to A. This conveyance
may be unfair to B, but it is not a 'fraudulent conveyance'

256. Id.
257. Van Iderstine,227 U.S. at 582.
258. Boston TradingGrp., 835 F.2d at 1508.
259. Van Iderstine,227 U.S. at 582.
260. Boston TradingGrp., 835 F.2d at 1508.
261. The facts of Boston TradingGroup are recounted supra at Part II.B.4.a.
262. Boston TradingGrp., 835 F.2d at 1510-11.
263. Id. at 1511.
264. Id. Similarly, in a typical Ponzi case, the debtor, like Shaw, through fraud or
embezzlement, uses investor money to make payments to other investors. As in Boston
Trading Group, the transferees have no "special relationship" with the debtor, but are arm's
length clients. The debtor retains no control over the payments made to transferees. The
transfers are payments for contractual obligations. Significantly, payments made by a debtor
to Ponzi scheme victims do not match Judge Breyer's three paradigms. See infra Part
III.A.3.c.
265. Boston Trading Grp., 835 F.2d at 1508 (emphasis in original).
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because it satisfies a debt owed to a person who is, at least, a
legitimate creditor.266
Judge Breyer's interpretation of the fraudulent conveyance statutes matches
the Court's earlier analysis under Coder 6 ' and Van Iderstine.268 The purpose
of fraudulent transfer statute is not to provide equal distribution to
creditors. That is the function of preference statutes and only for transfers
made during the short preference period. "The basic object of fraudulent
conveyance law is to see that the debtor uses his limited assets to satisfy
2 69
some of his creditors; it normally does not try to choose among them."
d. The distinction between actual and constructive fraud
Judge Breyer noted the distinction between actual and constructive
fraud. Actual fraud requires that the debtor has "an actual intent to defraud
270
as exemplified by the three paradigms" presented supra. Although the
paradigms indicate the need for closer scrutiny when a transfer is to a
relative or associate, not every such transfer is fraudulent. Common law
courts "sometimes found it difficult to decide whether a debtor's
conveyance, say to a relative or associate, in fact amounted to a device to
'hinder, delay or defraud' creditors while reserving some benefit for the
debtor."2 7 ' In the absence of a confession by the debtor, the court had to
infer actual intent by considering the surrounding circumstances.
Circumstances such as insolvency and inadequate consideration became
known as "badges of fraud," which supported an inference of fraudulent
transfer in otherwise close cases.272 Some of these badges of fraud were
codified in the constructive fraud provision.273
266. Id.
267. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a.
268. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.b.
269. Boston Trading Grp., 835 F.2d at 1509 (emphasis in original). The court handling
some of the Madoff cases distinguished Boston Trading Group, noting that ratable
distributions for victims-defendants under SIPA is governed by different statutes and
priorities than the typical bankruptcy code sections. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L.
Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Madoff Sec.), 476 B.R. 715, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
270. Boston TradingGrp., 835 F.2d at 1509.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Judge Breyer noted the inclusion of badges of fraud in the constructive fraud section
of the Uniform State Law of Massachusetts and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Id. at
1509. The badges of fraud included in the Code's constructive fraud subsection are: receiving
less than a reasonably equivalent value, being insolvent, having unreasonably small capital,
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The trial court in Boston Trading Group found there was not enough
evidence of the debtor's actual intent to defraud creditors to allow the
question to go to the jury. The receiver appealed.274 The receiver argued that
every transfer made with actual intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud"
creditors is a fraudulent transfer.27 5 Since Shaw defrauded his clients of
funds with which to pay Burnazos and Burnazos knew of the fraud, the
transfers should be avoidable. 276 The First Circuit declared that it had
"found no modern case (nor any reference in any modern case, treatise, or
article to any case in the past 400 years) that has found a fraudulent
conveyance in such circumstances." 277 The circumstances, as analyzed by
Judge Breyer, were that Shaw used fraud to obtain the funds transferred to
Burnazos and that Burnazos "[knew] but did not participate in [the initial
fraud]."278

Judge Breyer reasoned that fraud used to obtain the funds is not
ordinarily relevant to the transfer itself. "Fraudulent conveyance law is
basically concerned with transfersthat 'hinder, delay or defraud' creditors; it
is not ordinarily concerned with how such debts were created."279 Judge
Breyer further noted that the facts in Boston Trading Group do not match
any of the three actual fraud paradigms. 28 0 Consequently, the receiver could
only recover the money under a fraudulent transfer claim by proving the
two prongs of the constructive fraud provision: failure to give equivalent
value and insolvency. 281 The trial court refused to give the requested jury
instruction that the jury must find Shaw insolvent for the receiver to win on
the constructive fraud claim.2 82 Burnazos was therefore entitled to a new
trial.

having no ability to pay debts as they become due, and transferringto an insider. See supra
note 183.
274. Boston TradingGrp., 835 F.2d at 1509.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. (emphasis in the original).
280. See supra Part II.B.4.c.
281. Boston Trading Grp., 835 F.2d at 1510.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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e. The subjective standard for good faith
Affirming the lower court's dismissal of the actual fraud count, Judge
Breyer addressed "a second, independent reason" why the jury verdict in
favor of the receiver on the constructive fraud count could not stand.2 " The
lower court's instruction to the jury on good faith was inadequate. The trial
court "refused to instruct the jury that a transfer that simply constituted a
'preference' did not, by itself, constitute fraud or show lack of 'good
faith.' 285 When Burnazos tried to argue this point to the jury, the trial court
stated, "that is not the law."286 Judge Breyer points out that even if Burnazos
knew the money he received had been gotten from Shaw's clients through
fraud and Burnzos was paid preferentially over other creditors, "that fact in
and of itself, is not sufficient to show lack of 'good faith."'287
Acknowledging that good faith is difficult for courts to define, Judge
Breyer nevertheless reasoned:
Whatever "good faith" may mean, however, we believe it does
not ordinarily refer to the transferee's knowledge of the source of
the debtor's monies which the debtor obtained at the expense of
other creditors. To find a lack of "good faith" where the
transferee does not participate in, but only knows that the debtor
created the other debt through some form of, dishonesty is to
void the transaction because it amounts to a kind of 'preference'concededly a most undesirable kind of preference, one in which
the claims of alternative creditors differ considerably in their
moral worth, but a kind of preference nonetheless. 288
Judge Breyer further noted that with all the motives fully known, the lower
court had already found, and the First Circuit Court affirmed, that there
"[Wlhat reason
was no basis for a claim under the actualfraud provision.2 8 '1
could there be for presuming fraudulent intent in such circumstances?"290
The Boston Trading Group standard for good faith required more than
just knowledge of the fraud. The Boston TradingGroup court reasoned that
a court could find a lack of good faith "where the transferee participates in
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at 1511.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1512.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
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the original dishonesty
."291 Significantly, Burnazos did not know of
Shaw's dishonest misappropriation of funds when they entered into the sale
of Boston Trading Group. Therefore, Burnazos could not be charged with
the kind of subjective knowledge that would make him a participant in the
fraud. In this way, Judge Breyer's analysis matches that of Van Iderstine and
Dean.m The First Circuit acknowledged that other courts have supported a
more expansive definition for good faith but noted that in each case the
transfer resembled the classic fraudulent transfer paradigms. In contrast,
the transfer in Boston Trading Group concerned only "the source of the
funds transferred, the transferee bore no special relationship to the
transferor, and the transferee did not participate in the fraud."293
f.

Other courts accept Boston's reasoning

Quoting Boston Trading, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in HBE
Leasing294 agreed with the First Circuit's reasoning regarding what
constituted good faith. The court noted that some New York cases had
"broadly construed the reference to 'good faith"' in the New York
fraudulent transfer statutes but that "other authorities have cautioned
against an expansive reading."29 5 The court embraced the more conservative
Boston Trading approach. 296 The court held that where "a transferee has
given equivalent value in exchange for the debtor's property, the statutory
requirement of 'good faith' is satisfied if the transferee acted without either
actual or constructive knowledge of any fraudulent scheme."297 The court
clarified that the "requirement of 'good faith' refers solely to 'whether the
grantee knew, or should have known, that he was not trading normally, but
that ... the purpose of the trade, so far as the debtor was concerned, was the
defrauding of his creditors.'"298 The determining factor, then, for good faith
291. Id. The First Circuit subsequently affirmed just such a lack of good faith in a 1991
case where the transferee "had long had an intimate financial relationship" with the debtor
and the transfer was "a sham." Max Sugarman Funeral Home, Inc. v. A.D.B. Investors, 926
F.2d 1248, 1253, 1255-56, 1256 n.13 (1st Cir. R.I. 1991).
292. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
293. Boston Trading Grp., 835 F.2d at 1513.
294. HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1995).
295. Id. at 636 (citing Boston TradingGrp., 835 F.2d at 1512-13).
296. Id.
297. Id. (emphasis added). The court's wording left open the door for an expansive
definition of constructive knowledge to include "inquiry notice" that a deal was too good to
be true. See infra Part III.C.3.
298. HBE Leasing,48 F.3d at 636. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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is whether the transferee participated in the fraud by accepting a transfer
that the transferee knew was made solely for the purpose of defrauding
other creditors. The court agreed with Judge Breyer that fraudulent transfer
avoidance is a legal rather than equitable doctrine. 29 9 The court reasoned
that the state fraudulent transfer statute "makes clear, even the preferential
repayment of pre-existing debts to some creditors does not constitute a
fraudulent conveyance, whether or not it prejudices other creditors." 300
The Second Circuit Court followed similar reasoning in Sharp Int'l Corp.
v. State Street Bank & Trust Co."'1 The directors of Sharp falsified nonpublic
financial records, especially accounts receivable, in order to facilitate
borrowing increasingly large sums of money from various lenders. 302 The
directors then looted more than $44 million from Sharp and diverted it to
their other entitieS.303 State Street Bank, one of Sharp's lenders, became
increasingly suspicious of Sharp's activities.304 State Street Bank, by then
aware that Sharp was defrauding its investors, demanded repayment of the
loan from the proceeds of new loans from unsuspecting lenders.30 5 Sharp
obtained $25 million in new loans from innocent investors and used half to
pay off the State Street loan. 0 6 Soon after, the fraudulent scheme was
discovered and Sharp was forced into bankruptcy. 30 7 The bankruptcy trustee
attempted to avoid the payment to State Street on the theory that State
Street lacked good faith.3 0 s
The bankruptcy court dismissed the claim and the district court affirmed
the decision, concluding that "although Sharp had adequately alleged State
Street's actual knowledge of the [entire fraudulent] scheme, Sharp had not
alleged that State Street 'participatedin' or 'induced"' the fraud.'09 The court
found that Sharp had no fiduciary duty to other creditors, and therefore its
silence about the fraud was not bad faith even though it knew that the
299. Id. at 634.

300. Id.
301.
54-55,
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Sharp Int'l Corp. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Sharp Int'l Corp.), 403 F.3d 43,
(2d Cir. N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 46.
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
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source of the funds for its payments was defrauding investors.3 10 The court
concluded:
The decisive principle in this case is that a mere preference
between creditors does not constitute bad faith: "Even the
preferential repayment of pre-existing debts to some creditors
does not constitute a fraudulent conveyance, whether or not it
prejudices other creditors ... ." Nor does it matter that the

preferred creditor knows that the debtor is insolvent."'
Even though the transactions in Sharp and Boston Trading Group
involved loans instead of other forms of investments more often
encountered in Ponzi schemes, the principles distilled by the courts in
applying the fraudulent transfer statutes should still apply. It would mock
the concept of "uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies"312 if the
definition of fraudulent transfer and good faith depends on whether the
transferee lent money or invested in stocks. The principles established over
decades and embraced in Boston Trading Group, HBE, and Sharp are that
preferences are not avoidable as fraudulent transfers and that a finding of
bad faith requires knowledge of and participation in the debtor's fraud.
C. The Shifting Jurisprudence
Boston Trading expounded the principles of fraudulent transfer law that
had remained consistent for almost a hundred years. In summary,
fraudulent transfers are designed to set aside transfers made with the intent,
whether actual or inferred, to transfer debtor property out of the easy reach
of creditors. Additionally, fraudulent transfers usually follow one of three
paradigms: (1) a transfer in name but not substance; (2) a transfer to one
with a favored relationship; or (3) a transfer that makes the property
illiquid.31 1 Specifically, a mere preference among creditors is not a
fraudulent transfer." Furthermore, even if a transfer is fraudulent, a
transferee that takes for value and in good faith is allowed to keep the

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id.
Id. at 54 (quoting HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 634 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1995)).
U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.b.
See discussion supra Part II.B.4.c.
See id.
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transfer up to the amount of the value given. 316 A transferee who knew
before the transfer that the debtor intended to defraud, and thus is deemed
to have participated in the fraud, lacks good faith and may not claim the
defense."
Some modern courts have deviated from these well-established
principles. Much of the deviation can be traced to the seminal Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Agricultural Research."' Other courts have
followed the Ninth Circuit's lead. This section provides an overview of
Agricultural Research and its impact on modern jurisprudence. Part III"
infra discusses problems with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and the
resulting improper and inconsistent application of fraudulent transfer
doctrine.
1. AgriculturalResearch
a.

The facts

AgriculturalResearch involved a Hawaiian firm, Agretech, that solicited
investors to give Agretech seeds and a cash advance for Agretech's
cultivation of the seeds.3 20 Agretech entered into a contract with Grant to
cultivate seeds.32 ' Pursuant to the agreement, Agretech received the seeds
Grant had purchased and a payment to cover Agretech's anticipated
cultivation expenses. 3 22 In exchange, Agretech promised to purchase the
resulting seedlings from Grant for $229,000 fourteen months later.323 In
316. See discussionsupra Part II.B.4.e.
317. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.c.
318. In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1990).
319. See infra Part III.
320. Agric. Research, 916 F.2d at 532.
321. Brief for Appellants at 2, In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 532
(9th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-15416), 1989 WL 1129295. The limited partnership that contracted
with Agretech was Palm Seedling Partners-A. Grant-Buskett Management Corporation was
the general partner of Palm Seedling Partners-A. Robert Grant, personally, was a limited
partner in Palm Seedlings-A. This Comment will refer to the Appellants collectively as
"Grant" as did the Appellants in their brief. Id. at *1. Pursuant to the contract, Grant
purchased palm seeds from a California seed broker unaffiliated with either Grant or
Agretech. Id. at *2.
322. Agric. Research, 916 F.2d at 532.
323. Id. Grant agreed that if the germination rate fell below 65%, then he would acquire
additional seeds. Id. This would not be a problem since Grant had an express guarantee from
the seed broker of a 65% germination rate. Brief for Appellants, supra note 321, at 2. The
seed broker shipped only half the seeds and notified Grant that the shipped seeds were
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spite of poor germination rates with the first set of seeds, but with the
replacement seeds on their way, Agretech paid Grant half the promised
payment with a promise to pay the remaining half in six months, after the
new batch of seeds had begun to sprout.324 Agretech paid the second half of
the promised payment a month late, claiming it was experiencing
temporary cash flow problems.325
The bankruptcy trustee filed suit against Grant two and a half years later
claiming that Agretech was a Ponzi scheme that paid Grant by using funds
of new investors rather than from business profits.2 Grant argued that
Agretech had in fact sold the Grant seedlings to an unrelated party for
$263,000, and thus received full value; the bankruptcy trustee contested the
fact. 327 Grant claimed Agretech did receive value.328 The trustee countered
that the $229,500 in payments by Agretech to Grant were part of a Ponzi
scheme and Agretech did not receive value because few of the seeds actually
germinated. 329 Grant maintained through a sworn affidavit that Grant acted
in good faith at all times and in all respects.3 30 The trustee argued that the
possibly damaged-the seed broker had already filled out the insurance forms just in case.
Id. at 3. Grant transferred his account balance, and his guarantee rights, with the seed broker
to Agretech so it could obtain the required seeds elsewhere, but Agretech was unable to do
so. Id. at 4. Ultimately, the seeds were obtained nearly a year later from the original seed
broker. Agric. Research, 916 F.2d at 532. While the court simply references this as a "second
shipment," the appellant brief notes that the seed broker sent an entirely new shipment,
including replacement seeds for those that had been damaged or had not germinated in the
first shipment. Brief for Appellants, supra note 321, at 4.
324. Brief for Appellants, supra note 321, at 4.
325. Agric. Research, 916 F.2d at 533.
326. Id. at 531.
327. Reply Brief for the Appellants at 1,In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d
528 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-15416), 1989 WL 1129297. Grant based the argument on an
affidavit by the purchaser of the seedlings and the bankruptcy trustee's sworn testimony in
court that he was unaware of the checks that documented the purchase. Id. The trustee
acknowledged that a buyer had paid Agretech $263,000 for seedlings, but contested that the
seedlings were from Grant's specific seeds. Answering Brief of Appellee at 30, In re Agric.
Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-15416), 1989 WL
1129296.
328. Brief for Appellant, supra note 321, at 13. The value included $56,000 worth of
seeds, a $40,000 payment to Agretech for their cultivation services, assignment of all contract
rights and credits with the seed broker, including the seed broker's express guarantee that the
seeds would germinate at a rate of 65%, a $40,000 bond and $100,000 insurance policy with
an Agretech subsidiary as named beneficiary. Id.
329. Answering Brief of Appellee, supra note 327, at 10-11.
330. Brief for Appellants, supra note 321, at 14.
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test for good faith is objective, not subjective, and Grant lacked good faith
because a reasonably prudent man would have been put on inquiry notice
by cash flow problems and overpayment for seedlings. 3 31 The Ninth Circuit
Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the
bankruptcy trustee.332
b.

The Ninth Circuit Court's reasoning
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the actual fraud theory of fraudulent
transfer. The court began its analysis of actual intent by noting that "the
mere existence of a Ponzi scheme ... has been found to fulfill the
requirement of actual intent on the part of the debtor." 333 The court found
that the trustee argued "convincingly" that the first payment to Grant could
not have come from profits from the seeds Grant purchased and therefore
must have come from other investors. 334 The court then noted,
"Distributing funds to earlier investors from the receipt of monies from
later investors is the hallmark of Ponzi schemes."3 " Thus, in the first
paragraph of actual intent analysis, the court disregarded Grant's proffered
evidence of a legitimate business transaction and embraced a broad
definition of Ponzi scheme and then used the inference of a Ponzi scheme
to presume actual intent.336 Having presumed that the transfers to Grant
were made by Agretech with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud its
creditors, the court chose not to address the constructive fraud claim.337
The court then addressed Grant's good faith defense. Although the court
acknowledged that summary judgment was usually not appropriate for an
issue of good faith, the court noted that "appellants carry the burden of
demonstrating their objective good faith at trial."3 . The court declared that
"courts look to what the transferee objectively 'knew or should have known'
in questions of good faith, rather than examining what the transferee
actually knew from a subjective standpoint. "39 The court reasoned that
331. Answering Brief of Appellee, supra note 327, at 21.
332. In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 542 (9th Cir. 1990).
333. Id. at 536. See discussion infra Part III.A.
334. Agric. Research, 916 F.2d at 536.
335. Id.
336. Id. The court also reasoned that operating a business to the detriment of creditors
was sufficient to show actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Id.
337. Id. at 538-39.
338. Id. at 539.
339. Id. at 535-36.
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Grant's "subjective assertions of good faith," including a sworn affidavit,
were irrelevant. 3" Although the court proceeded to analyze Grant's
subjective good faith as the basis for the ruling,"4 ' later courts adopted the
Ninth Circuit Court's objective standard. 34 2
2. Other Courts Follow AgriculturalResearch
Five years after Agricultural Research, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals became the first circuit to adopt the Ninth Circuit's objective
standard. In re Sherman3 13 involved an alleged fraudulent transfer of rental
properties between family members. 3 " The case did not involve a Ponzi
scheme. After noting that the Bankruptcy Code does not define good faith,
the Eighth Circuit Court declared, "To determine whether a transferee acts
in good faith, courts look to what the transferee objectively 'knew or should
have known' instead of examining the transferee's actual knowledge from a

340. Id. at 536.
341. Id. at 539-40. The court weighed the evidence presented by the trustee and by Grant
and found that Grant's statement to Agretech that a prompt payment of money due would
induce other investments supported the existence of a Ponzi scheme. Id. at 539. The court
reasoned that Grant's procurement of guarantees that the seeds would germinate and the
later shipment of replacement seeds was not sufficient to show that Grant was not complicit
in the fraud. Id. The court reasoned that Grant's research of Agretech before investing was
not probative because Grant was unaware that Agretech was paying more to investors than it
was taking in. Id. at 539-40. On the one hand, the court reasoned that Grant's statement that
more investments would be made if Agretech timely paid what was owed, was "a strong
indication that Grant not only knew of the fraud, but was an active participant in it as well."
Id. at 539. On the other hand, the court reasoned that Grant should have realized there was a
fraudulent scheme because Agretech stated that funds had not come in as quickly as
expected. Id. at 540. Finally, the court found the "gross disparity" between the value of the
seeds and the first payment of "over $100,000" to be "very damaging" to Grant's case. Id. at
537.
342. In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 444 B.R. 767, 798-99 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012)
(observing that adoption by modern courts of the objective standard reflects "only the
inertial of a seminal case-In re Agricultural Research-thathas been cited again and again
without the benefit of reflection"). Two of the most prominent purveyors of the objective
approach are In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co., Inc., 84 F.3d 1330 (10th Cir.1996) and In re
Sherman, 67 F.3d 1348 (8th Cir.1995), both of which refer to Agricultural Research. Id. at
799.
343. In re Sherman, 67 F.3d 1348 (8th Cir. 1995).
344. Id. at 1355.
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subjective standpoint.""s The court cited AgriculturalResearch."' The court
then applied the standard to the facts without additional analysis.347
The following year, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the
objective standard in M & L Business Machine.48 After noting that the
Bankruptcy Code does not define good faith, the court observed that the
Eighth Circuit had recently adopted a standard requiring inquiry notice of
the debtor's possible insolvency. 4 ' The court then cited Agricultural
Research and said that "the Ninth Circuit relied on several Supreme Court
decisions construing 'good faith' in other contexts to conclude that 'courts
look to what'the transferee objectively knew or should have known in
questions of good faith, rather than examining what the transferee actually
knew from a subjective standpoint."'3 5 o The court observed that "the
majority of bankruptcy courts ... have followed the Eighth and Ninth

Circuits."" The Fifth Circuit adopted the objective standard, citing
AgriculturalResearch.352
III. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit Court's analysis of the "Actual Intent" section in
Agricultural Research begins with the statement, "As previously noted, the
mere existence of a Ponzi scheme, which could be established by
circumstantial evidence, has been found to fulfill the requirement of actual
intent on the part of the debtor."' In the next sentence, the court found
that the trustee had "convincingly argue[d]" that one payment received by
the transferee likely came from new investor money just deposited rather

345. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that good faith is
indicated when the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's-length transaction and when
the transferee does not have sufficient knowledge to suspect the debtor is insolvent. Id.
346. Id. Although the court declares an objective standard, the emphasis on trading
normally and knowledge before the transfer takes place, match the practical aspects of the
subjective standard. See discussion infra Part III.C.
347. Sherman, 67 F.3d at 1355.
348. In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co., Inc., 84 F.3d 1330 (10th Cir. 1996).
349. Id. at 1335-36.
350. Id. at 1336 (internal citations omitted). The problem with the court's reliance on
Agricultural Research is that the "Supreme Court decisions" do not support Agricultural
Research's holding. See discussion supra Part III.C.
351. M & L Bus. Mach. Co., 84 F.3d at 1336.
352. Id. at 1338.
353. In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 536 (9th Cir. 1990).
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than actual profits traceable to the transferee's investment.35 4 In the third
sentence, the court concluded, "Distributing funds to earlier investors from
the receipt of monies from later investors is the hallmark of Ponzi
schemes."3 " Thus in the first paragraph of analysis, the court presumed a
Ponzi scheme, based on the purported use of funds from a later investor to
pay the transferee, and then used that presumption to find, as a matter of
law, actual intent sufficient to avoid all transfers. The presumption is a
windfall for the trustee who does not have to prove actual intent, because it
is presumed, and who can enjoy a claw back period of up to six years.35 6
Where actual fraud is presumed, trustees do not have to rely on a
constructive fraud theory. Significantly, under the constructive fraud
theory, a transferee who gives equivalent value has a complete defense
against avoidance regardless of any fraud orfraudulent intent on the part of
the debtor or the transferee. This result follows because when the debtor
receives equivalent value the estate is not diminished and, therefore, the
transfer is not a fraudulent transfer at all."' Nevertheless, where courts
presume the avoidability of all transfers, they deprive investor victims of
their first line of defense-the chance to argue that the transfer was not
avoidable as a fraudulent transfer.
The Ninth Circuit Court acknowledged that the fraudulent transfer
provision "provides for an 'out' to certain transferees who . . . received the

transfer in good faith and gave reasonably equivalent value."5 8 The court
also acknowledged that "questions of good faith may generally be difficult
to establish on summary judgment" but emphasized that the transferees
"carry the burden of demonstrating their objective good faith at trial."359 The
court further acknowledged that neither party had briefed "what exactly
constitutes 'good faith.' 360 Nevertheless, the court applied an objective

354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Sinclair, supra note 28, at 78 ("For the investors with Bernie Madoff, or the several
other Ponzi cases now emerging in 2008's cataclysmic market reversal, a broad and
expansive reading of good faith can make the return of $125 million to the investors in
Bayou look like pocket change. This is even more troublesome because Bayou, Madoff and
other cases are in New York, which has a six-year statute of limitations for fraudulent
transfers.").
357. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.d.
358. Agric. Research, 916 F.2d at 535.
359. Id. at 539.
360. Id. at 535.
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standard to good faith and affirmed summary judgment for the trustee.36 1
Where courts presume that all transfers are actually fraudulent, victims
must resort to the good faith defense under § 548(c) as their last hope, only
to discover that courts disregard their proof of good faith as completely
irrelevant.3 62 Where courts apply an objective standard to good faith, they
deprive investor victims of the second line of defense-a chance to prove
that they are not culpable.363
Other courts have followed the Ninth Circuit's lead in presuming
avoidability and in applying an objective standard of good faith.
Presumptions are tempting shortcuts because they require minimal
analysis. Likewise, an objective standard promises to ease the burden on the
trustee and the court by allowing the court to step into the "reasonable,
prudent investor's" shoes and determine good faith. Although easier for the
courts, these two doctrines strip investor victims of any defense against an
aggressive trustee. For that reason, the doctrines deserve analysis. The
analysis will show that neither doctrine should be adopted.
A. An Avoidability PresumptionLacks Sufficient Legal Basis
The Ninth Circuit Court embraced a presumption that all transfers in a
Ponzi scheme are avoidable as fraudulent transfers. Many courts are willing
to follow the Ninth Circuit's lead and first presume that a Ponzi scheme
exists and then presume that a Ponzi scheme "is sufficient to establish actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors so as to permit avoidance as a
fraudulent transfer under § 548(a)(1)(A)." 3 " Once courts use these
presumption shortcuts, still other courts follow the practice. 6 1 Courts
361. Id. at 536.
362. See id. ("subjective assertions [are] of no moment").
363. See discussion infra Part III.C.
364. In re Whitley, 463 B.R. 775, 781 (M.D.N.C. 2012). See also In re IFS Fin. Corp. 417
B.R. 419, 439 (2009) ("The Fifth Circuit and other circuits have repeatedly held that the
existence of a fraudulent scheme itself is sufficient to find that a transfer made in furtherance
of that scheme was made with fraudulent intent.").
365. See, e.g., Whitley, 463 B.R. at 781-82 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012) (relying primarily on a
quote from Agricultural Research when it considered the matter as an issue of first
impression); see also In re Dreier LLP, 452 B.R. 391, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying a
motion to dismiss after "[aipplying the Ponzi scheme presumption"). For a further example
of the willingness of courts to accept presumptions without analysis, consider the following.
The court in In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1990), cited
Conroy v. Shott, 363 F.2d 90, 92 (6th Cir. 1966), for its statement that "the debtor's actual
intent to hinder, delay or defraud its creditors may be inferred from the mere existence of a
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justify the presumption by reasoning that each transfer to one investor
creditor was intended to "hinder, delay, or defraud" another investor
creditor. Indeed, the reasoning goes, the whole purpose of paying out
returns is to lure in more investors creditors, which indicates intent on the
part of the debtor to defraud all the investor creditors. Nevertheless, the
presumption ignores well-established fraudulent transfer doctrine, and
usurps Congress's careful balancing of public policy goals.
1. The Term "Ponzi Scheme" Lacks a Consistent Definition
The presumption that "the mere existence of a Ponzi scheme" makes all
transfers avoidable rests on the finding of a Ponzi scheme. Black's Law
Dictionary provides a typical definition of a "Ponzi scheme":
A fraudulent investment scheme in which money contributed by
later investors generates artificially high dividends for the
original investors, whose example attracts even larger
investments. Money from the new investors is used directly to
repay or pay interest to earlier investors, without any operation
or revenue-producing activity other than the continual raising of
new funds. 66
The definition leaves unclear whether a Ponzi scheme should be found
where the rate of return was not "artificially high,"' where something other
than the original investor's "example attract[ed]" the new investors, 368 or
Ponzi scheme." Agricultural Research, 916 F.2d at 535. But the Conroy v. Shott citation is a
long quote from the district judge with no citations or legal analysis by the district court
judge except an observation that the debtor's scheme was "the essence of simplicity, not to
say of stupidity." Conroy, 363 F.2d at 92. Following the long excerpt, the Sixth Circuit Court
provides no legal analysis. Id. at 93. The court did, however, vacate and remand the case for a
new determination of damages. Id. In spite of the lack of legal analysis Conroy v. Shott was
cited by Agricultural Research. A Westlaw search indicates that Agricultural Research has
been cited by more than twenty other courts in at least four different circuits for the
proposition that "the mere existence of a Ponzi scheme" is sufficient to find all transfers
avoidable under section 548(a)(1).
366. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1198 (8th ed. 2004).
367. See, e.g., Breeden v. Thomas (In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.), No. 98-61376, 1999
Bankr. LEXIS 1843 at *5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 1999) (finding a Ponzi scheme although
"[a]t all times, the effective rate of interest paid to Defendant ranged from six to eight
percent, a rate of return considered non-usurious under the laws of both New York and
Vermont"). See also Kurzawa, supra note 29 at 463 (discussing Bennett Funding Group).
368. See, e.g., Barasch, supra note 32, at 924 (finding a Ponzi scheme although victims
purchased fictitious certificates of deposit).
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where the debtor had some "operation or revenue-producing activity" from
which at least some of the dividends might have been paid. 369
The defendants in Bayou370 argued that the presumption should not be
applied because the debtor's business lacked signs of a "true Ponzi scheme
(promise of high returns, no legitimate underlying business activity and the
certainty that later investors cannot possibly be repaid)."137 The court
rejected the "restricted definition" for a broader one.372 A Ponzi scheme is
"any sort of inherently fraudulent arrangement under which the debtortransferor must utilize after-acquired investment funds to pay off previous
investors in order to forestall disclosure of the fraud." 73 Significantly, the
Bayou court eliminated from the definition the characteristics that would be
a sign to would-be investors that the deal was "too good to be true"artificially high rates of return and no legitimate underlying business.
Given the enormous advantage that accrues to the trustee when a court
presumes a Ponzi scheme, a broad definition is troubling. Agricultural
Research exemplifies the danger. The Ninth Circuit Court rejected the
transferee's argument that an undisputed $263,000 purchase by a customer
of the debtor within the same month as the transfer to the transferee was
evidence against a Ponzi scheme." Instead, the court micro-analyzed the
financial transactions and found that the payment by the customer could
not have been from profit generated by the transferee's investment. 37 5 The
source of the funds, therefore, must have been another investor.3 76 Further,
the court rejected the transferee's evidence that the business was legitimate
at the time he invested. 7 ' The court's analysis that early investors were paid

369. See, e.g., In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 536 (9th Cir. 1990)
(finding a Ponzi scheme although it was undisputed that a customer had paid $263,000 near
the time of the disputed transfer for seedlings grown by the debtor-the only question being
whether the seedlings were from the transferee's seeds).
370. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 362 B.R. 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
371. Id. at 633.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Agric. Research, 916 F.2d at 536.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 542. The court rejected these arguments even though the appeal concerned a
motion for summary judgment. Id. The trial court's grant of summary judgment and the
Ninth Circuit Court's affirmation removed the transferee's opportunity to present evidence
that would have argued against a Ponzi scheme.
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with the funds of later investors rested primarily on one transaction.
Nevertheless, the court found a Ponzi scheme.
2.

The Avoidability Presumption Ignores That Congress Distinguishes
Between Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers

Some courts have read the plain text of § 548(a)(1)(A) and reasoned that
if the debtor's intent was to defraud any creditor, then the nature of the
transfer is irrelevant. The transfer is avoidable as a fraudulent transfer.
Although the analysis appears reasonable on its face, such an interpretation
contradicts Congress's intent. The Supreme Court has cautioned that "[t] he
plain meaning of words should be conclusive, except in cases where the
literal interpretation produces a result demonstrably at odds with the
intention of the drafters."378 A literal interpretation of § 548(a)(1)(A)
produces a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of Congress.
a.

"Hinder, delay, or defraud"

Congress intended the phrase "hinder, delay, or defraud" to be
interpreted in keeping with its common law meaning, not as a disjunctive
string of words. The phrase "hinder, delay, or defraud" appeared in the
Statutes of Elizabeth, which were promulgated in 1570.379 The phrase was in
common use when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act more than 300
years later.so In 1909, the United States Supreme Court noted that the
phrase "is familiar to the law of fraudulent conveyances.""' Further, the
Court held that "Congress, in enacting [the fraudulent transfer section of
the Bankruptcy Act], and using the terms 'to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors,' intended to adopt them in their well-known meaning."382 In
addition, the Court emphasized that "there can be no doubt that Congress
intended the words employed should have the same construction and effect
as have for a long period of time been attributed to those words." 383
Having concluded that Congress intended the well-established meaning
for "hinder, delay, or defraud," the Court distinguished fraudulent transfers
from preferences. A fraudulent transfer must have actual intent to hinder,
378.
(1989)).
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

Sinclair, supra note 28, at 80 (citing United States v. Ron PairEnt. Inc., 489 U.S. 235
In re Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc., 124 B.R. 383, 390-91 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991).
Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 242 (1909).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 243.
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delay, or defraud creditors.3" On the contrary, "[t]he mere fact that one
creditor was preferred over another" does not qualify as a fraudulent
transfer."'s
Some courts have failed to recognize the context of the phrase. Courts
use the term "hinder, delay or defraud" as a disjunctive string of words."'
Isolation of the word "defraud" tends to focus the attention on the fraud
perpetrated by the debtor instead of the nature of the transfer. Faced with
blatant fraud, courts fail to distinguish between fraudulent transfers that
"hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors and preferences that merely prefer one
investor creditor over another. The Supreme Court's warning still holds
true: "In construing the bankruptcy act this distinction [between
preferences and fraudulent conveyances] must be kept constantly in
mind."387
b.

Two separate code sections for two separate tools

Significantly, Congress distinguished between preferences and
fraudulent transfers by creating two separate sections of the Code. Section
547 contains the avoidance statute for preferences." Preferences may be
avoided under § 547 regardless of the intent of the debtor, regardless of the
good faith of the transferee, and regardless of value given.38 9 Preferences are
malum prohibitum-wrongbecause the Code says so, but only to the extent
specified by statute.3 90 The preference statute does not differentiate, but
rather casts its net over all transfers made during the preference period so
that an equitable distribution may be made. Congress balanced the harsh
391
result with a very short window of avoidability-only ninety days. "[Bly
definition all transfers in furtherance of a Ponzi scheme are preferential, yet

384. Id. (emphasis added).
385. Id. at 242.
386. See, e.g., In re Hunter, 06-60694, 2008 WL 2076750 at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 15,
2008) ("The operative clause is disjunctive.").
387. Coder,213 U.S. at 241.
388. See 11 U.S.C. § 547; see also discussion supra Part II.B.3.
389. See 11 U.S.C. § 547.
390. Van Iderstine v. Nat'1 Disc. Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582-83 (1913). See discussion supra
Part II.B.3.a.
391. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).

260

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:209

under the Code the trustee may recover only those transfers made within
ninety days before bankruptcy."392
Section 548 and fraudulent transfer avoidance, on the other hand, claw
back those transfers that diminish the estate. 3 93 This provides a bigger pool
of property from which to pay creditors, but Congress limited avoidance to
those transfers that took money out of the reach of creditors. "[F]raudulent
transfer law is not concerned with equality among creditors. Instead, its goal
is distributionalenhancement for a diligent creditor or, in the context of
bankruptcy, for all creditors [as a group].""' Payment of existing creditors
does not diminish the estate as a whole because the decreased cash also
results in a decreased liability. 39 Other creditors have no legal interest in
specific property of the debtor."' "The basic object of fraudulent
conveyance law is to see that the debtor uses his limited assets to satisfy
some of his creditors; it normally does not try to choose among them.""
The Code's recognition of antecedent debt as value shows that fraudulent
transfer avoidance is not designed for distributional equality. Section
548(d)(2)3 98 defines "value" as including antecedent debt.399 The Code
sanctions the payment by the debtor of one creditor over another, so long as
some creditor is paid. Section 548, therefore, is not a tool to redistribute
debtor property from one creditor to another. Congress enacted § 548 to
empower the trustee to claw back from non-creditors property that had
been fraudulently removed from the estate. Sadly, when Congress
combined the Bankruptcy Act's actual and constructive fraud sections into
one section in the Code, the wording became less clear and suggests that a
transfer may be avoided from a creditormerely if the transferor had actual
392. In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 887-88 (D. Utah 1987). The court in
Independent Clearing House suggested that all payments in a Ponzi scheme should be
avoidable-back to the very first payment. Id. Nevertheless, the court conceded that the
Code does not allow a trustee to do so. Id. at 888.
393. GLENN, supra note 83, § 275 ("[A]n essential feature of the fraudulent conveyance
is[] depletion of the debtor's estate.").
394. In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 270 B.R. 92, 99 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2001) (quoting
Unified Commercial Capital,260 B.R. 343, 352 n.10 (W.D.N.Y. 2001)).
395. GLENN, supra note 83, § 293.
396. Id. § 235.
397. Boston Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1509 (1st Cir. Mass. 1987).
398. Section 548(d)(2)(A) ('"[Value' means property, or satisfaction or securing of
present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise to
furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor.").
399. Id.
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intent to defraud. Such an interpretation, however, ignores Congress's
purpose in distinguishing preferences from fraudulent transfers. Section
547 seeks equality among creditors, judging creditor against creditor.
Section 548 judges a non-creditor against the estate.
Congress created two different tools for the bankruptcy trustee. Congress
listed the two avoidance powers in different statutes, gave different
avoidance criteria, and established different avoidance periods. Congress
mitigated the harsh results of the preference statute by limiting the
avoidance period to only ninety days. Where courts employ a Ponzi
presumption of avoidability, they ignore Congress's distinction and create
the harsh results of the preference statute stretched over a period of years.
3. The Avoidability Presumption Ignores Court Precedent That
Distinguishes Between Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers
As early as 1909, the United States Supreme Court observed that
fraudulent transfers and preferences "are sometimes spoken of in such a
way as to confuse the one with the other."' 00 Nevertheless, the Court
emphatically declared, "An attempt to prefer is not to be confounded with
an attempt to defraud, nor a preferential transfer with a fraudulent one.""
It further warned, "In construing the bankruptcy act this distinction must
be kept constantly in mind."o 2 Courts adopting the Ponzi presumption of
avoidability have neglected the Court's warning.4 03

400. Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 241 (1909).
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. One court, relying on Agricultural Research, reasoned that "[blecause a Ponzi
scheme is, by definition, unable to repay all its creditors, any transferfrom the scheme to a
creditor is necessarily made with the intent to hinder the rights of some other creditor."
Wing ex rel. 4NExchange, L.L.C. v. Yager, 103CV54DAK, 2003 WL 23354487 (D. Utah Nov.
7, 2003) (emphasis added) (quoting Missal v. Washington, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6016, *7
(D.D.C.1998) (quoting In re Agricultural Research & Technology Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528,
535 (9th Cir.1990))). Another court reasoned that "a debtor's knowledge that future
investors will not be paid is sufficient to establish his actual intent to defraud them." In re
Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 860 (D. Utah 1987). Both of these courts confused
preferences, which is the paying of one creditor over another, with fraudulent transfer, which
a payment to a non-creditor to the detriment of the estate. The presumption of avoidability
seeks to avoid the transfers merely because one investor creditor was paid and another was
not. Payment of one creditor over another is a preference. The fraudulent transfer provision
provides no support for avoidance of preferences.
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A fraudulent transfer is not avoidable just because it is a
preference

The Supreme Court has steadfastly held that merely preferring one
creditor over another is not a fraudulent transfer. In Coder, the Court noted
that the phrase "hinder, delay, or defraud" "was used at common law, and
in the statute of Elizabeth."4" In common law, "[t]he mere fact that one
creditor was preferred over another, or that the conveyance might have the
effect to secure one creditor and deprive others of the means of obtaining
payment, was not sufficient to avoid a conveyance."40 s The Court reasoned
that Congress in "using the terms 'to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors,'
intended to adopt them in their well-known meaning as being aimed at
conveyances intended to defraud."4 06 One might be tempted to argue that
since Ponzi schemes defraud investor creditors, all transfers are avoidable.
But the Court specifically held that a "mere preferential transfer, as
distinguished from a fraudulent one," was not avoidable under the
fraudulent transfer provision."7 Therefore, a court must determine whether
the transfer was merely a preference before allowing fraudulent transfer
avoidance.
In Van Iderstine, the Court analyzed the connection between fraudulent
transfers and preferences. The Court reasoned that there is "no necessary
connection between the intent to defraud and that to prefer.""' The Court
noted a difference of quality between the two in both law and conscience.40 9
In Coder, the Court reasoned that whether a transfer was fraudulent had to
be measured by the "bona fides of the transfer."41 0 The Van Iderstine Court,
likewise, focused on whether the transferee was a legitimate creditor. The
Court found that transfer of a mortgage on the debtor's property, which
moved the property out of the reach of creditors, was a legitimate
transaction even though the transaction meant that other creditors would
not be paid. The resulting preference to the transferee over other creditors
404. Coder, 213 U.S. at 242. See discussion supra Parts II.A.2, III.A.2.a.
405. Coder, 213 U.S. at 242.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 243.
408. Van Iderstine v. Nat'1 Disc. Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913). See discussion supra Part
II.B.l.a.
409. Van Iderstine, 227 U.S. at 582. Fraudulent transfers are malum in se-"inherently
and always vicious;" preferences are malum prohibitum-"innocentand valid, except when
made in violation of the express provisions of a statute."Id. at 582.
410. Coder, 213 U.S. at 243.
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was not avoidable."' This holding aligns with Coder: "For it is the wellsettled law that a conveyance made in good faith, whetherfor an antecedent
or present consideration,is not forbidden by such statutes, notwithstanding
the effect may be that it hinders or delays creditors by removingfrom their
4 12
reach assets of the debtor."
If the investor victim of a Ponzi scheme is a
legitimate creditor and received a payment on a legitimate debt owed by the
debtor, then the transfer cannot be avoided under the fraudulent transfer
statute.
b. A fraudulent transfer is not avoidable just because the debtor is
defrauding creditors
The Boston Trading Group court observed that preferences are not
avoidable under fraudulent transfer statutes, even when a debtor is involved
in illegal activity.' The court declared that it had "found no modern case
(nor any reference in any modern case, treatise, or article to any case in the
past 400 years) that has found a fraudulent conveyance in such
circumstances."" The circumstances included a defendant who had actual
knowledge of the transferor's fraud and knew that the funds used to pay the
defendant were acquired by defrauding others.4" Nevertheless, the payment
was not avoidable as a fraudulent transfer. The result was "concededly a
most undesirable kind of preference, one in which the claims of alternative
creditors differ considerably in their moral worth, but a kind of preference
nonetheless."4 16
Likewise, the Sharp court reasoned that a "conveyance which satisfies an
antecedent debt made while the debtor is insolvent is neither fraudulent nor
otherwise improper, even if its effect is to prefer one creditor over
another."417 This was true even though the transferee knew that the debtor
would defraud new investors to pay the debt.41 s If transferees who had

411. Van Iderstine, 227 U.S. at 583.
412. Coder,213 U.S. at 243 (emphasis added).
413. Boston Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1508 (1st Cir. Mass. 1987)
("The cases and the commentators also state that fraudulent conveyance law does not seek to
void transfers in a fourth circumstance known as a 'preference."').
414. Id. at 1510.
415. Id. at 1506.
416. Id. at 1512 (emphasis in original).
417. Sharp Int'l Corp. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Sharp Int'l Corp.), 403 F.3d 43,
54 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2005) (citation omitted).

418. Id.
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actual knowledge of the debtor's fraud and the fraudulent source of the
funds in Boston Trading Group and Sharp benefitted from the distinction
between preferences and fraudulent transfers, then afortiori a Ponzi scheme
victim with no knowledge of the fraud should enjoy the same benefit.419
c. A fraudulent transfer is usually not avoidable unless it
resembles well-established paradigms
The Van Iderstine Court noted that transfers could be "fraudulent [1]
because the debtor intends to put the property and its proceeds beyond the
reach of his creditors; or [2] because he intends to hinder and delay them as
a class; or [3] by preferring one who is favored above the others."42 0 The
Court went on to clarify that "favored" ones referred to a debtor's "family or
business connections."42 ' Similarly, Judge Breyer gave three basic paradigms
for fraudulent transfers. 422 A debtor may seek to place property out of reach
of creditors by exchanging liquid assets, like cash, for illiquid ones, like a
homestead.423 A debtor may transfer the property to one in a "special
relationship," like a friend or family member.4 24 A debtor may transfer
property but retain the benefit.4 25 Though penned nearly eighty years apart,
the observations of the two courts are very similar. In each of the

419. See Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 491 (D. Conn.
2002) ("Regardless of the Debtor's business, legitimate or otherwise, so long as the Debtor
received 'reasonably equivalent value' in exchange for its transfer of property, there has been
no diminution in the Debtor's estate and the remaining creditors have not been damaged by
the transfer."). Admittedly, Boston Trading Group and Sharp transfers appear to be
distinguishable from a typical Ponzi payment because the transfers were on account of
unsecured notes. Many Ponzi schemes have no legitimate underlying business transactions.
The payments to Ponzi investors, however, are not for the fictitious business deal. The
transfers are for the non-fictitious antecedent debt based on a claim of rescission of the
fraudulent contract. See discussion supra Part II.B.4.d. Therefore, like Boston Trading Group
and Sharp, the investor receives transfers as a legitimate creditor.
420. Van Iderstine v. Nat'l Disc. Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913).
421. Id. An intent to prefer family or business connections is not per se a fraudulent
transfer, but "is an important matter to be considered in determining whether there was also
[an intent] to defraud." Id. By implication, if an intent to prefer a family or business
connection merely presents the possibility of a fraudulent transfer, then "preferring" one
arm's-length creditor over another should provide little basis for a fraudulent transfer claim.
422. Boston Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1508 (1st Cir. Mass. 1987). See
discussion supra Part II.B.4.c.
423. Boston TradingGrp., 835 F.2d at 1508.
424. Id.
425. Id.
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paradigms, the debtor is using the particular transaction to gain something
particular for himself at the expense of the estate-something more than a
generalized desire to defraud creditors and abscond with estate funds.
Judge Breyer found it significant that the transfer in Boston Trading
Group did not match any of the paradigms. Similarly, it is significant that
payments in a typical Ponzi scheme do not match any of the paradigms
either. Investor victims typically have no special relationship with the
debtor. The debtor retains no benefit, like use of the money, from the
transfer. Payments to a particular investor victim does not put the property
out of the reach of creditors-the transfer puts property into the hands of a
particular creditor. Where a court adopts an avoidability presumption, the
court fails to evaluate the lack of similarity with the paradigms.
Courts justify the presumption by reasoning that the debtor gains a
generalized benefit because it can prolong the fraud by which later creditors
are defrauded. A similar scenario was presented by Glenn in Fraudulent
426
A debtor mortgages all its property and uses
Conveyances and Preferences.
the loan proceeds to pay off existing credit accounts with the sole intention
of inducing more credit. The debtor buys as much as possible on credit,
sells the goods, and absconds with the funds. When the fraud is exposed,
creditors find that all the property within reach has already been transferred
to others.427 The scenario resembles a Ponzi scheme where some creditors
are paid by the debtor solely to induce others to invest. When the scheme
implodes, victims find that all property has already been paid out to other
investors. Glenn, however, finds a fraudulent transfer in this situation only
if the transferee is complicit in the fraud. This analysis matches the Court's
reasoning in Van Iderstineand Dean.42 8
426. GLENN, supra note 83, § 303.

427. Id.
428. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. In Van Iderstine the debtor placed most of the estate
property out of the reach of creditors by using its accounts receivable as collateral for several
loans. Van Iderstine v. Nat'l Disc. Co., 227 U.S. 575, 580 (1913). The day after receiving the
last loan, and without paying any creditors with the proceeds, the debtor filed for
bankruptcy. Id. The court found no fraudulent transfer, even though all property from which
other creditors could have been paid had already been transferred to the defendant. Id. at
583. A key factor in the Court's decision was the fact that the defendant "had no relation
with the persons to whom the money was paid [the debtor]." Id. As in Van Iderstine, the
debtor in Dean placed all of his property out of the reach of creditors by using it as collateral
for a loan. Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 442 (1917). But in contrast to Van Iderstine, the Dean
court found that the transfer was avoidable as a fraudulent transfer because the defendant
had to have known that he was helping the debtor defraud the creditors. In Dean, the
defendant was the debtor's brother-in-law. Id. The two cases were distinguished by the
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Courts, possibly overwhelmed by the scope of the fraud, can see that
many transfers in a Ponzi context do not match the traditional paradigms.
Rather than find that the transfers, consequently, are not fraudulent
transfers, they add Ponzi scheme transfers as a new paradigm. Such a large
departure from Congress's careful balancing of equities between preferences
and fraudulent transfers should be done by Congress, not the courts.
d. A fraudulent transfer is not avoidable unless it diminishes the
estate
According to the Coder Court's analysis, avoidance of a transfer as
actually fraudulent requires more than the intent on the part of the debtor
to "hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors; the transfer must also diminish the
estate.429 A transfer that diminishes the estate is a fraudulent transfer, and
conversely, a transfer that does not diminish the estate-even if it
represents a preference-is not a fraudulent transfer.430 The Court's
reasoning in Coder and Van Iderstine is augmented by scholarly
authority.' "[T]he test of whether a transfer can be avoided under the
fraudulent transfer statute is whether, as a result of the transaction, the
debtor's estate was unfairly diminished ... [A]n essential feature of the
fraudulent conveyance is depletion of the debtor's estate."432 Of singular
importance to the question of fraudulent transfer is the effect the transfer
has upon the estate. Put succinctly, "So long as the transfer does not
433
diminish the estate, the motives of debtor and grantee are immaterial."
Regardless of the debtor's motive in making a transfer, if an antecedent debt
is paid, the estate is not diminished and the transfer cannot be avoided.
An estate is not diminished if the debtor receives equivalent value for the
transfer, which may be an exchange of property or satisfaction of an
relationship between the debtor and the transferee. Where there was no special relationship,
there was no fraudulent transfer.
429. Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 242-43 (1909) (holding that Congress intended "hinder,
delay, or defraud" to have its common law meaning and that under that meaning a payment
on account of antecedent debt is not a fraudulent transfer even when it prefers one creditor
over another).
430. See Van Iderstine, 227 U.S. at 583 (finding that a transfer that depleted the estate and
deprived creditors of the opportunity to be paid was nevertheless not a fraudulent transfer
because the transferee was itself a legitimate creditor).
431. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 44 (1989) (quoting Glenn as
"scholarly authority").
432. GLENN, supra note 83, § 275
433. Id. § 300.
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antecedent debt. 34 Courts have uniformly recognized that return of
principle in the context of a Ponzi scheme constitutes a dollar-for-dollar
equivalent "value."' Courts that apply a presumption that all transactions
are actually fraudulent relegate the giving of equivalent value to the good
faith defense under 548(c); this is incorrect. A transfer that does not
diminish the estate is not voidable as a fraudulent transfer at all because the
creditors as a group have not been hindered, delayed, or defrauded. The
issue of a good faith defense need never be reached.
A presumption that all transfers in a purported Ponzi scheme are
fraudulent transfers ignores the distinction between preferences and
fraudulent transfers and denies the investor victim the opportunity to show
that the transfer was merely a preference. "[F]raudulent conveyance
remedies are designed to 'right' the singular 'wrong' of a windfall received at
the expense of the debtor's estate, not to police the legality of transactions
otherwise fair to the debtor."436 Victims of a fraudulent scheme are tort
creditors with a claim of rescission for the fraudulent transaction. "[A]
preference by definition is made on account of an antecedent debt."437 At
least to the extent that a creditor victim has not received back his invested
principal, transfers to that transferee merely prefer one creditor victim over
another. Such preferences are not avoidable under the fraudulent transfer
provision regardless of the debtor's actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors because the transferee has not received a windfall at the expense of
the debtor's estate. Instead, the creditor victim has received back a portion
of what was rightfully owed on account of the rescission claim. A correct
analysis of avoidability requires the court to determine if the transferee is a
legitimate tort creditor. Courts that employ a Ponzi presumption of
fraudulent transfer rob creditor victims of a key defense to the trustee's claw
backs.438
Significantly, payments on account of antecedent debt are avoidable
under § 547, the preference statute, but not under § 548, the fraudulent
434. Id. § 293.
435. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.d.
436. Daly v. Parete (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 270 B.R. 92, 97 (Bankr. D. Conn.
2001).
437. In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 469 B.R. 713, 757 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012).
438. In fact, it is even more than a "defense" because the burden of proof is on the trustee
to prove that the transfer is avoidable. The trustee must show that the estate did not receive
equivalent value in the transfer. This the trustee cannot do where creditor victims have an
unpaid rescission claim, and "net-loser" victims are thereby protected from the trustee's
attempt to claw back funds.
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transfer statute. A payment on account of a legitimate antecedent debt does
not diminish the estate because the debtor receives equivalent value in the
form of reduced obligation for the transfer given. When the debtor uses its
limited funds to pay some legitimate creditor, even if the debtor's intent is
to defraud other creditors, no fraudulent transfer has occurred."' The
source of the funds used to pay the debt does not turn a preference into a
fraudulent transfer." 0
B. An Avoidability Presumption Turns FraudulentTransferAvoidance into
a "Super Preference"
Some courts have tried to "forc[e] the square peg facts of a 'Ponzi'
scheme into the round holes of the fraudulent conveyance statutes in order
to accomplish a further reallocation and redistribution to implement a
policy of equality of distribution in the name of equity.""1 The avoidability
presumption allows the trustee to "utilize the fraudulent conveyance
statutes as 'super preference' statutes."442 The "super preference" applies
equitable reasoning to a legal remedy and allows courts to impermissibly
override Congress's careful balancing of policy objectives.
1. A "Super Preference" Impermissibly Seeks "Equity" by Conflating
Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers
Fraudulent transfer avoidance is a legal, not equitable, remedy.43 But a
growing number of courts find the legal remedies of the Code unjust and
inapplicable to Ponzi schemes." "[C]ourts have long held that [it] is more
equitable to attempt to distribute all recoverable assets among the
439. Boston Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1512 (1st Cir. 1987) ("'[I]f all
that has occurred is a preference, there is no fraudulent conveyance, regardless of the
debtor's evil thoughts, and the grantee's knowledge upon that subject.'" (quoting GLENN,
supra note 83, §298a)).
440. Id. at 1513 (finding that the transferee's knowledge that the transferred funds were
obtained by defrauding investors was insufficient to find a fraudulent transfer).
441. In re Unified Commercial Capital, Inc., 260 B.R. 343, 350 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001)
affd sub nom. In re Unified Commercial Capital, No. 01-MBK-6004L, 2002 WL 32500567
(W.D.N.Y. June 21,2002).
442. In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. 480, 489 (D. Conn. 2002).
443. Boston Trading Grp., 835 F.2d at 1508.
444. See, e.g., In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 887 (D. Utah 1987)
(lamenting that it was "[u]nable to do perfect justice," that the Code is premised on
presumptions inapplicable to Ponzi schemes, and that it was constrained by the short and
restricted avoidance provisions in the Code).
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defrauded investors who did not recover their initial investments rather
than to allow the losses to rest where they fell."44 One court went so far as
to designate victims of the fraud as co-perpetrators because the fraud could
not have continued without the investment of new investors." Faced with
hundreds or thousands of financially devastated victims, courts and trustees
look to what is often the only source of recoverable assets-the payments
made to earlier investors."7 The use of the fraudulent transfer section as a
"super-preference" tool allows courts to promote "equity," but does so by
conflating preferences and fraudulent transfers as equally "equitable"
remedies.
a.

Seeking "equity"

Preference statutes seek "distributionalequality""' by avoiding transfers
as a blanket action-all transfers made within ninety days of bankruptcy
are presumed avoidable unless an exception is shown."' In contrast, the
purpose of fraudulent transfer avoidance is to "'right' the 'wrong' of a single
transaction received at the expense of the debtor's estate.""o The
presumption underlying fraudulent transfer doctrine is that the transferee
holding the property is entitled to keep the property unless the trustee can
show why the estate, and therefore the creditors, has a stronger claim on the
property. Nevertheless, courts have increasingly used the avoidability
presumption to sweep as many transfers as possible into the pool so that the
court can reallocate the money in the way it deems "equitable." The
Independent Clearing House court lamented that the preference period in
§ 547(b) was only ninety days and suggested that Congress change the rule
to allow avoidance of all preferences transferred.4 5' What Independent
ClearingHouse suggested, other courts have done by fiat.

445. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 776 (9th Cir. 2008).
446. In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 981 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) ("An investor in a ponzi
scheme is not only a victim but at the same time is a perpetrator, for without the continual
influx of new funds the scheme quickly collapses and the Debtor is unable to perpetuate the
scheme and create harm to new creditors.").
447. Mallory A. Sullivan, Note, When the Bezzle Bursts: Restitutionary Distributions of
Assets After Ponzi Schemes Enter Bankruptcy, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1589, 1609 (2011).
448. Daly v. Parete (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 270 B.R. 92, 99 (Bankr. D. Conn.
2001).
449. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a.
450. In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. 480, 489 n.19 (D. Conn. 2002).
451. In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 871 (D. Utah 1987).
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The case of Robert Kowell and his mother Edna4 52 exemplifies the use of
a super-preference to turn a legal remedy into an "equitable" one. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that "it may seem 'only fair"'
that Kowell be allowed to keep the profit earned on his money." The court
acknowledged "[t]hat would be true as between" Kowell and the Ponzi
scheme operator, but "not true as between him and either the creditors of or
other investors in the corporations."" The court's rationale clearly
expresses its intention to effect an equitable redistribution among creditors.
This redistribution between creditors is allowed only under the preference
statute. The fraudulent transfer statute allows a weighing of equities only
between the transferee and the estate. The court admitted that as between
Kowell and the estate, Kowell would be allowed to keep his money. The
court, however, used the fraudulent transfer tool to create a "superpreference" that reached back two years instead of ninety days. Ignoring the
Supreme Court's distinction between the malum prohibitum preference and
the malum en se fraudulent transfer, the court claimed that Ponzi scheme
"winners" should be subject to fraudulent transfer avoidance "even if
innocent of any fraud themselves."" The court acknowledged the
"significant hardship when an innocent investor such as Kowell is informed
that he must disgorge profits he earned innocently.""' Nevertheless, the
court concluded, "We see nothing inequitable in the effort to mitigate the
losses suffered by other innocent investors."" The court erred because
fraudulent transfer is a legal, not equitable, remedy. Congress set a narrow
window on avoidance of preferences, designed to redistribute equally
among creditors. The narrow window prevents just such a hardship as the
court imposed on Kowell in the name of equity.
b. "Equality is equity"
Perhaps no phrase in fraudulent transfer analysis is so often taken out of
context as "equality is equity."" The phrase originated in the Supreme

452. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 2008). See also supra Part I (giving the
facts of the case).
453. Kowell, 533 F.3d at 770.
454. Id. (citation omitted).
455. Id.
456. Id. at 776.
457. Id.
458. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 13 (1924). See discussion supra Part II.B.1.d.
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Court's opinion in Cunningham v. Brown, the original Ponzi case,... and is
often quoted to justify clawing back all transfers in order to redistribute
them among the victims. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court in Kowell
observed,
Addressing the victims of the original Ponzi scheme, the
Supreme Court commented that "[i]t is a case the circumstances
of which call strongly for the principle that equality is equity." In
this case, then, equity compels that Kowell share some of the
hardship equally with those who lost their initial investment."0
Ignoring the distinction between law and equity,"' the court used
preference reasoning to convert the legal remedy of fraudulent transfer into
a tool to spread hardship and suffering among victims. 4 62 Cunningham is
inapposite to analysis of fraudulent transfer because the case dealt
exclusively with preferences.63 Preference avoidance does indeed seek
equality of distribution. Fraudulent transfer avoidance, however, does not.
The Court warned courts to keep the distinction in mind.'
Preference doctrine provides that transfers made during the ninety-day
preference period be avoided so that all similarly situated creditors can be
treated equitably. 6 1 Some courts reason that all Ponzi scheme investors "are
of the same class" because all gave their money to the perpetrator expecting
to invest in an enterprise that was fictitious. 66 On the contrary, the
bankruptcy trustee seeks claw backs specifically because investors are not
similarly situated. Some have received all their principal back, with profit.

459. Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 13.
460. Kowell, 533 F.3d at 779-80 (quoting Cunningham,265 U.S. at 13).
461. See Boston Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1508 (1st Cir. Mass. 1987)
(distinguishing between fraudulent transfer doctrine, which flows from law, and restitution,
which flows from equity).
462. But see Daly v. Parete (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 270 B.R. 92, 98 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 2001) (rejecting the trustee's reliance on the "equality is equity" argument).
463. Id. at 98-99. ("It is also important to note that Cunningham's 'equality is equity'
pronouncement was made in the context of a preferential transfer case."); see discussion
supraPart II.B.3.
464. Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 241 (1909) ("In construing the bankruptcy act this
distinction [between preferences and fraudulent conveyances] must be kept constantly in
mind.").
465. In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 871 (D. Utah 1987).
466. Id. ("All investors in a Ponzi scheme are creditors of the same class, so in theory all
should be treated equally.").
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Some have received back a portion of their investment. Some have received
back nothing at all. Preference doctrine should not be applied to fraudulent
transfers. The use of preference reasoning to justify avoidance of fraudulent
transfers ignores the different purposes of the two doctrines.
2.

"Super Preferences" Impermissibly Usurp Congress's
Policy-Making Role

As the Kowell court admitted, avoidance of Ponzi scheme transfers
causes hardship to innocent victims." The extent to which some creditor
victims are made to suffer to benefit others is a policy question for Congress
to decide. Currently, Congress has enacted no "Ponzi exception" to the
well-established principles of transfer avoidance. Until it does so, courts
should not create an exception by use of the "super preference."
Not all courts believe that a Ponzi scheme is fundamentally different
from other bankruptcies. The court in In re Unified Commercial Capital,"
for example, criticized courts that ignore universally accepted business
practices, such as enforcing contracts, just because the company involved is
perpetrating a Ponzi scheme.4 69 The court suggested that Ponzi schemes are
not that "different from the many other fraudulent schemes seen in
bankruptcy cases."o70 "[Hiopelessly insolvent consumer debtors with
negative monthly disposable income who borrow money they will never
repay so that they can do things such as go on vacation" resemble Ponzi
scheme operators who never intend to pay their creditors.17 ' "[H]opelessly
unprofitable businesses ... are diminished by paying interest on funds
borrowed when they had negative disposable income or were unprofitable,"
just like Ponzi schemes are hopelessly insolvent and are diminished by each

467. Kowell, 533 F.3d at 779-80.
468. In re Unified Commercial Capital, Inc., 260 B.R. 343 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001).
469. Id. at 351 ("I do not understand why courts have found them to be so different from
the many other fraudulent schemes seen in bankruptcy cases where innocent individuals lose
money, that they are willing, in the name of public policy, to do what I consider to be such
an injustice to the fraudulent conveyance statutes by ignoring the universally accepted
fundamental commercial principal that, when you loan an entity money for a period of time
in good faith, you have given value and are entitled to a reasonable return.").
470. Id.
471. Id. at 352.

2013]

VICTIMIZED AGAIN

273

payment to investor victims.47 2 Other courts have agreed with this
reasoning.'
The effect of the preference statute is "to move the determination date of
the estate backwards in time to effect a redistributionamong creditors."4 74
Redistribution necessarily creates loss from some innocent and diligent
creditors in order to benefit other creditors. Such an infliction of harm on
innocent creditors requires careful consideration and balancing of policy
objectives. As noted by the Cunningham Court, Congress established a
policy of "equality is equity" for preferences,"' but Congress chose to limit
the painful consequences of equal distribution to the very narrow
preferential period of ninety days.' Congress established a second brightline for fraudulent transfers by allowing avoidability only if made within
two years of the bankruptcy filing.' Congress protected creditors from
harsh results by restricting avoidability to those transfers either that were
intended to actually "hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors, which as noted
supra... are distinct from preferences, or that depleted the estate through
unequal exchange of consideration. The Code does not suggest that
Congress intended for the pain of redistribution of funds from one
innocent creditor to another be extended from ninety days to two years.
Fraudulent transfer avoidance is a legal, not equitable, remedy."'
Congress codified the fraudulent transfer statute within the section of the
Code entitled "The Estate."48 e Congress intended fraudulent transfer to be a
legal question: whether the transferred property was legally part of the

472. Id.
473. See, e.g., Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 491 (D.
Conn. 2002) (holding that payment of reasonable interest to innocent Ponzi scheme victims
was not avoidable as a fraudulent transfer).
474. Daly v. Parete (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 270 B.R. 92, 99 (D. Conn. 2002).
475. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 13 (1924). See discussion supra Part II.B.1.d.
476. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) ("[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor
in property ... on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition . . .. "). See

discussion supra Part II.B.3.a.
477. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) ("The trustee may avoid any transfer ... incurred by the
debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the
petition. .. ."). See discussion supra Part III.B.3.b.

478. See, e.g., supra Parts II.B.L.a; II.B.2; II.B.3; II.B.4.c; III.A.2.
479. Boston Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1508 (1st Cir. 1987). See
discussion supra Part II.B.4.b.
480. The Bankruptcy Code is codified as Title 11 of the U.S.C. Chapter 5 covers
"Creditors, the Debtor, and the Estate." Subchapter III is entitled "The Estate."
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bankruptcy estate. Congress crafted boundaries on the avoidability of
transfers. These boundaries carefully balanced policy objectives concerning
creditors, debtors, the needs of interstate commerce, and the needs of
society in general. Bankruptcy trustees sometimes "articulate[] sound
reasons why it might be wise to allow an exception ... where the trustee's
efforts stand to benefit hundreds of innocent investors.""' The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument. "However, to paraphrase
the Supreme Court, the issue is not whether such an exception would make
good policy, but whether the exception can be found in the Bankruptcy
Code."482 The plain language of the Code lacks an "illegality exception" for
transfers made in the course of a Ponzi scheme."' If Congress wishes for
Ponzi scheme bankruptcies to be adjudicated with different rules than other
bankruptcies, then Congress can amend the Code. Courts should not utilize
the fraudulent transfer statute as a "super preference" to circumvent the
Congress's Code provisions.
3.

"Super Preferences" Impermissibly Destroy the Protection of the
Constructive Fraud Provison

Historically, the test for actually fraudulent transfers focused on whether
the parties were "trading normally.""' Merely preferring one creditor over
another does not constitute a fraudulent transfer. By definition, a preference
is a transfer on account of antecedent debt.4 85 Also, by definition, payment
of antecedent debt is "value.""' Where the debtor receives equivalent value,
the estate is not diminished and no fraudulent transfer has occurred."
Consequently, the only time a preference may be properly avoided as a
fraudulent transfer is where the transfer was not "trading normally," as in

481. In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., Inc., 84 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996).
482. Id. at 1285-86.
483. Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 491 (D. Conn. 2002)
("Regardless of the Debtor's business, legitimate or otherwise, so long as the Debtor received
'reasonably equivalent value' in exchange for its transfer of property, there has been no
diminution in the Debtor's estate and the remaining creditors have not been damaged by the
transfer.").
484. GLENN, supra note 83, § 295 ("The question is solely whether the grantee knew, or
should have known, that he was not trading normally, but that on the contrary, the purpose
of the trade, so far as the debtor was concerned, was the defrauding of his creditors.").
485. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2).
486. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2).
487. Deptula, 286 B.R. at 491.
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the paradigms given by Judge Breyer488 and the Van Iderstine Court," or
where the transferee did not give equivalent value for the transfer. The first
situation falls under the actual fraud provision and the second situation falls
under the constructive fraud provision.
The addition of a constructive fraud provision 9 expanded the
bankruptcy trustee's avoidance powers to cover transfers that diminished
the estate, notwithstanding the lack of intent to conceal estate property
from creditors. If a trustee cannot meet-what was intended to be-the
high burden of showing that a particular transfer was an actually fraudulent
transfer, the trustee can still recover for the estate those funds transferred
with constructive fraud. For constructive fraud, the trustee needs show only
that the debtor did not receive equivalent value and that the debtor was
insolvent at the time of the transfer.' The Code still protects parties who
traded normally, at least to the extent of the value exchanged. Section
548(d)(2)(A) defines equivalent value to include antecedent debt.492 An
investor victim has a claim for rescission that constitutes antecedent debt.
Repayment of that debt constitutes value.' "This is so, notwithstanding
negligence or inquiry notice on the part of the investor."494 Under a
constructive fraud theory, even "net-winners" are liable only for fictitious
profits.
By accepting a presumption that all transfers are avoidable under the
actually fraudulent provision, courts shift the focus from whether the trade
appeared normal at the time of investment to whether, with perfect
hindsight, the deal was bogus. This shift destroys the balance of equities
established by Congress and deprives investor victims, both "winners" and
"losers," of the chance to argue that the fraudulent transfer was merely
constructively, not actually, fraudulent.
The distinction between actual and constructive fraud matters. Under
the actual fraud provision, the whole amount received by the investor
488. Boston Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504,1508 (1st Cir. Mass. 1987). See
discussion supra Part III.A.3.c.
489. Van Iderstine v. Nat'1 Disc. Co., 227 U.S. 575,582 (1913). See discussion supra Part
III.A.3.c.
490. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B). See discussion supra Part II.B.3.b.
491. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B).
492. Section 548(d)(2)(A) states that "'value' means property, or satisfaction or securing
of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise
to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A).
493. Sinclair, supra note 28, at 78.
494. Id.
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victim must be returned, including the principal. The investor victim then
bears the burden to prove good faith under § 548(c).'" The innocence of the
investor victim "[is] of no moment."196 Rather, the investor victim must
prove that a prudent investor would not have been suspicious of the
debtor's intent. Whether the investor acted in objective good faith is a
question of fact, generally requiring a trial. The defense, therefore, requires
the victim to expend substantial funds to defend the transfers already
received, and often spent.
On the other hand, under the constructive fraud theory, the transfer can
be avoided only if it is both not for equivalent value and not in good faith.
Therefore, the burden is on the trustee to prove both elements. Transfers of
"net-losers" are not avoidable because the debtor received value for each
transfer because the transfer paid down an antecedent debt."'
In summary, an avoidability presumption that all transfers were made
with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud deprives investor victims of
the safeguards that Congress built into the Bankruptcy Code. If the transfer
is merely a preference of one creditor over another, then it is not avoidable
as a fraudulent transfer at all. Nevertheless, a presumption allows it to be
avoided. Avoidance under the actual fraud theory requires the trustee to
show that the transfer was made to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, by
diminishing the estate or moving property out of the reach of creditors.
Even so, a presumption allows the trustee to bypass his burden of proof.
Where a transfer is a preference, the trustee must prove that the debtor did
not receive equivalent value under the constructive fraud theory.
Nevertheless, a presumption allows the transfer to be avoided without such
proof. An avoidability presumption of actual intent should not be used.
4. "Super Preferences" Impermissibly Shift the Balance of Equities
from One Victim to Another
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declared, "[Clourts have long held
that [it] is more equitable to attempt to distribute all recoverable assets
among the defrauded investors who did not recover their initial
investments rather than to allow the losses to rest where they fell."' In an
attempt to be "more equitable," courts use the "super preference" to
495. In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 535 (9th Cir. 1990). See
discussion infra Part III.C.2.
496. Id. at 536.
497. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.d.
498. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 776 (9th Cir. 2008).
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redistribute gains and losses among investor victims. What may appear
"just" in the eyes of the court, however, may not appear equitable to the
victims.
a.

"Super preferences" punish prudent investors

Super-preference distributions lack equity because they punish good
faith, prudent investors. Investors, especially those with short-term
investments, have often spent the money they received "on retirement
expenses, college funds or other daily living expenses."499 Adding insult to
injury, "because of the fraudulent activity of the bankrupt corporation, the
good faith investor has to defend himself in court and face having to return
the payments received to the estate." 00 The claw back of such funds creates
a tremendous hardship on investors. Irving Picard, the bankruptcy trustee
in the Madoff litigation, acknowledged this hardship when he allowed
victims to petition not to be sued.so' But even this action is inequitable
because it punishes those who have managed their money well and have
assets from which the trustee can recover. Prudent investors are targeted
simply because they managed their finances and investments better than
others. The use of a "super preference" to bring all transfers under the
avoidance power of a trustee allows the trustee to pick and choose which
victims to target.
Rothstein provides another example. Scott Rothstein orchestrated a Ponzi
scheme through his law offices whereby investors could purchase
discounted settlements in exchange for an immediate payment to the
client.502 The clients and settlements did not exist.s0 ' When the scheme
collapsed, the bankruptcy trustee sued investor victims, including "netlosers.""o The "net-losers" filed a motion to abate the proceedings against
them, arguing that because of their rescission claimssos the trustee could not

499. Kurzawa, supra note 29, at 463 (describing the Bennet Ponzi scheme where 3,000
good faith investors were sued by the bankruptcy trustee).
500. In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. 480, 491 n.21 (D. Conn. 2002).
501. Sullivan, supra note 447, at 1625. Hardship factors include foreclosure, bankruptcy,
living and medical expenses, and care of dependents. Id.
502. In re Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A., 464 B.R. 465,467 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2012).
503. Id.
504. Id. "Net-losers" are investors who received from the debtor less than they invested.
Id. n.7. "Net-winners" are investors who received from the debtor more than they invested.
Id. n.6.
505. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.d.
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recover from them and was wasting estate resources.506 The court denied the
motion, reasoning that "[i]n the end, it is the Trustee who makes the
determination whether to pursue claims. "507
b. "Super preferences" generate a windfall of litigation for the
trustee
In theory, courts use the "super preference" to allow the trustee to claw
back funds from a wide pool of investor victims so that the funds can be
equitably redistributed. The reality, however, is that much of the money
confiscated from targeted victims will never be distributed to other victims.
The money swept into the pool is used first to pay the trustee, the trustee's
attorney or attorneys, those hired by the trustee (including accounting
firms), real estate brokers, investigators, etc., as well as court costs. For
example, in less than six months, the Rothstein trustee generated over $1.5
million in fees and expenses paid to the trustee's own law firm and over
$600,000 paid to the accountant working for the trustee.so' Similarly, the
Lancer Management Group scheme, in Connecticut, "generated upwards of
$40 million in professional fees and costs" for the trustee's firm and
others.so' The trustee's attorney was the "second top earner in a Daily
Business Review survey" in 2010, "making a top wage of $735 an hour."510
Admittedly, these fees are not considered excessive based on the size and
scope of the fraud. Trustees and their attorneys must untangle a
complicated web of transactions and pursue hundreds or thousands of
lawsuits-often against investor victims. Nevertheless, millions of dollars of
funds clawed back from investor victims go to pay the trustee, his attorneys
and those working for the trustee rather than being "equitably" distributed
to victims.

506. Rothstein, 464 B.R. at 468.
507. Id.

508. John Paceti, Feds Seek to Take over Receivership, DAILY Bus. REV. (July 17, 2010),
http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/PubArticleFriendlyDBR.jsp?id= 1202469879654#.
509. Id.
510. Id. Some have suggested leaving the search for and distribution of Ponzi assets to a
government agency, like the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI usually investigates on
a parallel track with bankruptcy attorneys but are paid a fixed salary instead of by the hour.
Id.
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"Super preferences" result in inconsistent treatment

Fraudulent transfer doctrines are legal, not equitable, doctrines. Legal
doctrines have predictable consequences, but when courts use fraudulent
transfer avoidance as an equitable tool, inconsistency and inequity result.
(1) Choosingwhom to sue
Courts that use presumptions of avoidance to claw back funds justify the
action by reasoning that each transfer to a Ponzi investor merely prolongs
the scheme and allows the perpetrator to induce more victims. The Unified
Commercial Capital court rhetorically asks how those payments advance
the fraud any more than do payments to trade creditors, like the landlord,
utility company, or telephone service provider.' In addition, allowing the
enforcement of contracts entered into by a "Ponzi" perpetrator results in as
much of a diminution of the estate as paying earlier investors because the
payments for those goods and services could only come from the funds of
investors.512 Yet bankruptcy trustees who sue earlier investor victims rarely
pursue the debtor's trade creditors. One could argue that the payments for
telephone, electricity, and rent represent tangible benefits provided to the
debtor. Moreover, those very benefits promote and advance the fraudulent
scheme. The appearance of legitimacy-an office address, a telephone
number, and a fax machine-allows a person to perpetrate the fraud.
Courts and trustees pick and choose which creditors to target. "Again, if it is
simply a question of reallocating the risks and redistributing losses among
those giving value and fair consideration to an entity engaged in a 'Ponzi'
scheme, isn't that for Congress to do?" 5 "
(2) Interestfor the trustee, but notfor the victim
Unified Commercial Capital involved loans by individuals to the
company, which were paid back with reasonable market-rate interest.' The
511. In re Unified Commercial Capital, Inc., 260 B.R. 343, 352 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001)
affd sub nom. In re Unified Commercial Capital, No. 01-MBK-6004L, 2002 WL 32500567
(W.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002) ("What did the innocent investor victims that received reasonable
contractual interest payments do so wrong to diminish the estate of Unified Commercial
that the trade creditors did not do? ... Furthermore, in this case, goods and services
provided by trade creditors, such as telephone service, office space, and power to run
computers, allowed Unified Commercial to appear to be a legitimate business and also
furthered its fraudulent scheme.").
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 351.
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court held that payment of reasonable interest for the use of funds has
always been considered "value" in the business context.is The court
rejected the theory that the company's use of the funds to perpetrate a fraud
somehow erases the "universally accepted fundamental commercial
principal that, when you loan an entity money for a period of time in good
faith, you have given value and you are entitled to a reasonable return."5 16
Ponzi schemes operate on the debtor's use of investor funds. The investor
believes the company is using the funds to buy stocks, securities, fund
certificates of deposits, pay cultivation expenses or engage in other
legitimate investment activities. Often the company is using the funds
instead to promote the fraud. Nevertheless, use of money is a quintessential
form of business. Arguably, an investor victim should be entitled to both
return of their principal and a reasonable rate of interest. "[I]f Congress did
not intend such a result when the debtor was involved in a Ponzi scheme, it
should so specify in the Bankruptcy Code rather than leaving it to the courts
to ignore what is clearly value and fair consideration under the fraudulent
conveyance statutes.""' Few courts have followed Unified Commercial
Capital'slead.
The converse, however, has been widely accepted. Bankruptcy trustees
regularly win pre-judgment interest from investor victims because the
victims, albeit unknowingly, have been using the estate's money."' In spite
of one court's statement to the contrary, it is hard not to see pre-judgment
interest collected from an innocent victim as anything but a windfall for the
trustee.' The time value of money, then, flows only one way-to the
trustee.
(3) The tracingrequirement
Similarly, the issue of tracing is applied inconsistently to Ponzi transfers.
Courts presume that the funds received by an earlier investor came from a
later investor and are not a return of the investor's own funds. Because the
funds are money, usually deposited in a bank account, it is virtually

515. Id.
516. Id.
517. In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. 480, 489 (D. Conn. 2002) (citing Unified
CommercialCapital,260 B.R. at 350).
518. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 2008).
519. Id. (quoting In re P.A. Bergner & Co., 140 F.3d 1111, 1123 (7th Cir. 1998)
("[P1rejudgment interest should not be thought of as a windfall in any event; it is simply an
ingredient of full compensation that corrects judgments for the time value of money.")).
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impossible to prove whether the dollar bills received by the investor were
the same dollar bills given. Courts have construed this difficulty exclusively
in the trustee's favor. An investor cannot prove that his own dollars were
returned. The trustee does not have to prove the dollars were different. An
investor victim of a Ponzi scheme argued that the tracing requirements
should be applied consistently.5 2 0 The status quo should remain unless one
party or the other can prove its assertion through tracing. The Ninth Circuit
rejected the argument, noting that such a requirement on bankruptcy
trustees would be "unmanageable in practice."52 1 The court determined that
trustees do not have to follow the same rules of tracing that transferees must
follow to prove the transfer is not avoidable.5 22 The court reasoned that this
inconsistency was needed "in the typical Ponzi scheme case, where
documentation of transfers is less than complete, payments are sporadic
and not always in accordance with the documentation of the investment,
and neither the investor nor the debtor can recall precisely what the parties
intended." 23 Inconsistent application of business principles shifts
Congress's carefully balanced policy decisions decidedly in favor of the
trustee and to the detriment of investor victims. 5 2 4
C. The Shift to an Objective Standardof Good Faith Lacks Legal
Foundation
The avoidability presumption lacks a sufficient legal foundation and
should not be adopted. Nevertheless, even with the avoidability
presumption, a Ponzi scheme victim would enjoy some protection with the
good faith defense that Congress provided in § 548(c). Sadly, most federal
courts have ignored the well-established subjective standard for good faith
and replaced it with an objective standard that lacks sufficient legal support.
Like the avoidability presumption, the objective good faith standard can be
traced back to the Ninth Circuit Court's decision in Agricultural Research.
After the Ninth Circuit Court presumed avoidability of the transfers, the
520. Id. at 773-74.
521. Id. at 774.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. See also Sullivan, supra note 447, at 1595-96, 1595 n.27 (noting the court's rewriting
of the terms of SIPC insurance from replacement of stocks to the "net investment method"
because the extraordinary facts of the Madoff case made the method appropriate even
though, in many instances, it would not be and even though such a change violated
contractual expectations of the parties and left victims with huge uninsured losses).
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court acknowledged that the good faith defense of 548(c) provided an "out"
for investor victims.525 The court disregarded the defendant's attempts to
prove a lack of culpability, observing that subjective intent was irrelevant.5 26
Since then, the doctrine has become widely accepted in spite of its faulty
foundation. The Teleservices court is one of the few to criticize acceptance
of Agricultural Research's objective standard because it lacks "any critical
analysis."5 27 An analysis of the historical doctrine of good faith and a critical
look at AgriculturalResearch's rationale suggests the Teleservices court was
correct.
1. The Ninth Circuit's Shift to an Objective Standard Lacked a
Sufficient Legal Basis
The Ninth Circuit Court rejected the traditional subjective standard of
good faith and created an objective one in its place. The court quoted dicta
from In re Independent ClearingHouse5 28 to support the proposition that "a
lack of good faith is demonstrated by a transferee who knows that a debtor
is operating a Ponzi scheme."5 29 Then, citing only the two cases asserted by
the trustee's Appellee brief, the court declared,
These pronouncements indicate that courts look to what the
transferee objectively "knew or should have known" in questions
of good faith, rather than examining what the transferee actually
knew from a subjective standpoint. Therefore, appellants'
reference to the subjective assertions of good faith in the Grant
affidavit are of no moment. 530
The dicta and two cases, therefore, deserve a closer look.
a. Independent ClearingHouse dicta
The Ninth Circuit Court misstated the Independent ClearingHouse dicta.
The court stated, "One court has remarked that a lack of good faith is
demonstrated by a transferee who knows that a debtor is operating a Ponzi
51
scheme."1
Independent Clearing House actually said: "Certainly, if a
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.

In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 535 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 536.
In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 444 B.R. 767, 798-99 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843 (D. Utah 1987).
Agric. Research, 916 F.2d at 535.
Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 535 (citing In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 861 (D. Utah 1987)).
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defendant knew that the debtor was running a Ponzi scheme when he
advanced money to the debtor or knew of the debtor's insolvency at the
time of the allegedly fraudulent transfer, that knowledge might indicate a
lack of good faith."532 Significantly, the Independent Clearing House
standard was subjective and considered that an actual knowledge of a Ponzi
scheme prior to the investment might constitute bad faith. The Independent
Clearing House court declared, "The test is whether the transaction in
3
question bears the earmarks of an arm's length bargain."1 The court
reasoned that the promise of "exorbitant returns on a defendant's
investment, however, does not, without more, mean that the defendant
lacked good faith. . . . Moreover, because the debtors paid the promised
returns, at least initially, a defendant may have had no reason to suspect
that the debtors were insolvent."5 34 The court concluded that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment because it failed to take evidence "on
3
the subjective question of whether the defendants took in good faith."
Independent Clearing House does not support the Ninth Circuit's
affirmation of summary judgment. On the contrary, the Agricultural
Resources defendant proffered evidence that the debtor had paid the
promised returns, at least initially, and evidence that the transaction bore
the earmarks of an arm's-length bargain. 3 If the Ninth Circuit Court had
followed the rationale of Independent Clearing House, it would have
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the trustee.
b. Harrellv. Beall's inquiry notice
The Ninth Circuit's legal rationale for an objective standard rests on
Harrell v. Beall3 and Shauer v. Alterton.5 38 Both cases predate the
Bankruptcy Act, predecessor of the current Code, and the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyances Act.13 ' Thus, at the time these cases were decided,

532. Indep. ClearingHouse, 77 B.R. at 861-62 (emphasis added).
533. Id. at 862.
534. Id.
535. Id. (emphasis added).
536. See discussion supra Part II.C. 1.
537. Harrell v. Beall, 84 U.S. 590 (1873).
538. Shauer v. Alterton 151 U.S. 607 (1894).
539. The Bankruptcy Act was enacted in 1898. NORTON, supra note 44, § 1:15. The
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was proposed twenty years later. Fraudulent Transfer
Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION: THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
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there was no bankruptcy statute directly addressing procedures for
fraudulent transfers. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the cases still fail
to support the court's legal rationale.
The Ninth Circuit cited Harrell, without elaboration, and apparently
accepted the assertion in the trustee's appellee brief that Harrellstands for
the proposition that a "transferee cannot point to its avowed subjective
ignorance as a defense."54 0 Harrelldoes not support that conclusion.
In Harrell v. Beall, Harrell claimed he was an innocent purchaser for
value."' The court noted that the question presented was "wholly one of the
weight of evidence, involving no controverted proposition of law."542 The
Court affirmed the lower court's ruling that seventy-one pages of
documents helped prove that Harrell's knowledge of the fraud could be
inferred." In a three paragraph decision, the Court affirmed the lower
court's finding that the debtor was involved in a "barefaced fraud" and that
if the transferee did not know it, it was because he "intentionally shut his
eyes to the truth, and that he had such notice and information as made it his
duty to inquire further, and that the slightest effort by him in that direction
would have discovered the whole fraud."5" The Court's emphasis in Harrell
comports with its later holdings in Van Iderstine and Dean,' which were
decided under the Bankruptcy Act.
The Supreme Court's reasoning is consistent in Harrell, Van Iderstine,
and Dean. A transferee lacks good faith only when the transferee
participated in the fraud, either through actual knowledge of the fraud or by
consciously ignoring, at the time the transactionwas entered into, clear signs
that the transfer was designed to defraud creditors.
As such, it is difficult to characterize Harrell as having
established a standard where the transferee's good faith is to be
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Fraudulent%2OTransfer%20Act (last visited
Dec. 21, 2012). See discussion supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
540. Answering Brief of Appellee, supra note 330, at 25 ("In this case, as in Harrell v.
Beall, 84 U.S. 590 (1873), the transferee cannot point to its avowed subjective ignorance as a
defense.").
541. Harrell, 84 U.S. at 590. The subject property was sold "for a merely nominal sum,
one out of all proportion to its real value" to an intermediary, who was in collusion with the
debtor. The intermediary then sold to Harrell "for a sum far below the value of the property
purchased." Id.
542. Id. at 591.
543. Id. at 590-91.
544. Id. at 591.
545. See supra note 431.
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tested by the inquiries of a reasonably prudent man as opposed
to the transferee's own honesty and integrity. To the contrary,
Harrell seems to be more a harbinger of what is now known as
"willful blindness"-i.e., inexcusable avoidance of the obvious."
c.

Shauer v. Alton's definition of good faith ignored

The second "early case cited by the trustee" on which the Ninth Circuit
Court based its "prudent man"" objective standard was Shauer v. Alton.
The court based its application of Shauer on a single quote and no
discussion:
[K]nowledge or actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put
him, as a prudent man, upon inquiry as to whether his brother
intended to delay or defraud his creditors ... should be deemed
to have notice. .. as would invalidate the sale as to him. "
The court then concluded that Shauer stood for the proposition that "courts
look to what the transferee objectively 'knew or should have known' in
questions of good faith, rather than examining what the transferee actually
knew from a subjective standpoint.""' A closer look at Shauer shows that it,
like Harrell,does not support an objective "prudent man" standard for good
faith.
Shauer involved the sale of Louis Shauer's inventory and store to his
brother Gustave in full payment of a debt Louis owed Gustave.5s 0 The issue
was whether Gustave knew that Louis owed many debts, and this scheme
was merely a way to move the store and inventory assets out of the reach of
creditors." The jury instruction stated:
[I]f the facts brought to the attention of Gustave G. Shauer were
such as to awaken suspicion, and lead a man of ordinary
prudence to make inquiry, and he fails to make such inquiry,
then he is chargeable with notice of fraudulent intent and with

546. In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 444 B.R. 767, 800 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (footnote
omitted).
547. In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 535 (9th Cir. 1990).
548. Id. (quoting Shauer v. Alterton, 151 U.S. 607, 621 (1894)) (ellipses added by the
Agric. Research court).
549. Id. at 535-36.
550. Shauer v. Alterton 151 U.S. 607,619 (1894).
551. Id.
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participationin the fraud, and it will be your duty to find for the
defendant.552
Thus the question in Shauer was whether Gustave had participated in a
fraud against Louis's creditors or had acted in good faith. The United States
Supreme Court quoted with approval the definition of good faith found in
the Dakota statute:
[T]o express it exactly, good faith consists in an honest intention
to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another, even through the forms or technicalities of law, together
with an absence of all information or belief of facts which would
render the transaction unconscientious; and notice [of creditor
claims] is either actual or constructive.553
In the context of the Court's other holdings, taking advantage of another
creditor must be more than merely receiving a preference. It must include
malum in se conduct. It must be wrong.5
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit Court's citation of Shauer to support an
objective standard, the Supreme Court used a standard of "honest
intention" and "unconscientious advantage of another" to determine good
faith-a decidedly subjective and morally based approach not founded
merely on "inquiry notice." Even though the Court quoted an explicit
definition of "good faith," the Ninth Circuit Court failed to use the Court's
definition and instead exchanged the Court's subjective standard for its own
objective one.
The Ninth Circuit Court cited Shauer and Harrell and then stated,
These pronouncements indicate that courts look to what the
transferee objectively "knew or should have known" in questions
of good faith, rather than examining what the transferee actually
knew from a subjective standpoint. Therefore, appellants'
reference to the subjective assertions of good faith in the
[transferee's] affidavit are of no moment.5
If the Ninth Circuit Court had actually applied the standards from those
cases, the outcome would have been different. Both Harrelland Shauer were
concerned with the transferee's knowledge of fraud at the time the
552.
553.
554.
555.

Id. at 620-21 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 622 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 535-36 (9th Cir. 1990).
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transferee entered the transaction. This is important because it emphasizes
the Court's focus on whether the transferee, in effect, participatedin the
fraud by knowing beforehand what the debtor was doing. The transferee in
Agricultural Research proffered evidence that he was ignorant of the
scheme."' The trustee offered no evidence to dispute the transferee's
subjective good faith. Instead, the trustee argued, and the court accepted,
that the transferee could not point to his avowed ignorance as a defense. In
both Harrell and Shauer, the transferee was found, by trial jury, to be
actually aware of the debtor's fraudulent scheme to defraud creditors. In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit Court denied the transferee a trial because it
found actual knowledge to be irrelevant to an objective standard.
2.

A Shift to an Objective Standard Ignores Congress's Intent and the
Plain Meaning of Good Faith

Courts analyzing the issue of good faith uniformly note that the Code
does not define good faith, in spite of the critical position of good faith in
fraudulent transfer doctrine. Further, courts have been reluctant to
enunciate a firm definition. Apart from the Court's quotation of the Dakota
good faith standard in Shauer,"' the Supreme Court has not defined good
faith in the context of fraudulent transfers. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
gives guidance on defining an undefined term. First, "Congress says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what is [sic] says there."5 8
Congress could have chosen the objective phrase "knew or should have
known." Congress could have chosen the phrase "inquiry notice." "Instead,
556. See Brief for the Appellants, In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528,
532 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-15416), 1989 WL 1129295 at *6-7, 16. First, the transferee
"carefully researched and monitored [the debtor's] actions" before investing. Id. at *6. He
reviewed the debtor's unaudited financial statements, which had been prepared by a
reputable third-party accounting firm. Id. He was aware that a company dealing in foliage
grown by the debtor was voluntarily undergoing scrutiny by the Securities and Exchange
Commission as part of its registration process to make a public offering. Id. That company
had been featured in the March 1984 edition of Money magazine. Id. The transferee knew
that the debtor had been started by two well-respected state legislators and that the company
had a track record of timely making payouts to investors for two years prior to the
transferee's investment. Id. at *7. The transferee's contract with the debtor also involved
third parties including a seed distributor in another state and an insurance company. Id. The
transferee visited the debtor's place of business to confirm the contract was being performed.
Id. The transferee reinvested money in subsequent projects. Id. at *16.
557. See Shauer, 151 U.S. at 622.
558. Sinclair, supra note 28, at 80 (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union
Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1 (2000)).
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it used the words 'good faith,' which have nothing other than a subjective
meaning."ss
Second, "[t]he plain meaning of words should be conclusive, except in
cases where the literal interpretation produces a result demonstrably at odds
with the intention of the drafters."o Since Congress did not define "good
faith" in the Code, one must assume that Congress intended good faith to
have the meaning commonly in use when the Code was enacted. Congress
was undoubtedly aware of the definition of good faith used in the Uniform
Commercial Code-"honesty in fact."5 6' The promulgation of the Uniform
Commercial Code had highlighted the need for a reformed, uniform
bankruptcy system and Congress responded with the Bankruptcy Code.562
Since the primary purpose for the Bankruptcy Clause is to create a unified
national economy, 63 one can reasonably assume that Congress intended
terms undefined in the Code to have their standard business meaning. The
use of standard business meanings for other terms undefined in the Code
support this assumption.'"
In spite of these indications that Congress intended a subjective
definition of good faith aligned with the UCC's "honesty in fact" or the
Shauer Court's "honest intent," the push to substitute a new, objective
definition has infected the courts. To its credit, the Bayou bankruptcy court
attempted to explain why the definition used by the court is "somewhat
different from the traditional notion of good faith as the term is customarily
559. Id.
560. Id. (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235 (1989)).
561. Craig T. Lutterbein, Note, "Fraudand DeceitAbound" but Do the Bankruptcy Courts
Really Believe Everyone Is Crooked: The Bayou Decision and the Narrowing of "Good Faith,"
18 AM. BANR. INST. L. REv. 405, 446 (2010). Although an objective component was proposed,
it was rejected in the early definition. Id. The definition of good faith in the UCC as passed in
1978, roughly the same time that Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, was purely
subjective. Id. at 444 n.305 (citing Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 798, 812-14 (1958)). The objective prong was added in
the early 1990's. Id. The current UCC Definition is "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2012).
562. NORTON, supra note 44, § 2:1.
563. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
564. See, e.g., In re Price, 562 F.3d 618, 624 (4th Cir. 2009) (looking to the Uniform
Commercial Code to define "purchase money security interest"); In re Waner Corp., 146
B.R. 973, 979 (Bankr. N.D. M. 1992) (using Article 9 of the UCC to determine claim priority
on unperfected security interests); In re Fursman Ranch, 38 B.R. 907, 911 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1984) (noting that the term "feasible" is not defined in the code and looking to the business
concepts of earning capacity, dividend requirements, and capital structure).
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used by laymen."' The court acknowledged that "[iln common parlance,"
good faith means "a conformity with accepted standards of integrity, trust
and good conduct and the absence of any of the usual indicia of bad faith
such as dishonesty, deceit, intent to harm or complicity in some form of
wrongdoing."5" The court cautioned that "the narrow, layman's definition
is not the meaning ascribed to Section 548(c) 'good faith' by the case law."'
Rather, the court adopted the "broader meaning expressed in Black's Law
Black's Law Dictionary quoted the Court's subjective
Dictionary."'
definition of "honest intent" as well as "freedom from knowledge."5 6 9
Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court construed the definition to mean that an
investor who redeems his investment because he suspects the debtor might
be financially unstable cannot claim the good faith defense even if the
investor had no "bad faith."
[A]ny rational investor or financial advisor, on inquiry notice of
a warning signal respecting an investment, would be entirely
justified in requesting or recommending redemption and could
not be criticized for doing so. Indeed, it would be quite
reasonable for an investor to decide to redeem solely on the basis
of the red flag without making any inquiry, since the investor has
no obligation to any third party to make any inquiry. But if he
does so, the courts have held that he cannot invoke the good faith
defense under Section 548(c).s"o

565. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 396 B.R. 810, 847 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) affd in part,rev'd
in part,439 B.R. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
566. Id. at 847 (footnote omitted).
567. Id. at 847-48. By "case law," the court was probably referring to its lengthy
quotation of the Plaintiffs' [Trustees'] Omnibus Memorandum of Law, which stated that
"federal courts have reached a consensus that 'good faith' as used in section 548(c) must be
determined according to an 'objective' or 'reasonable person' standard, and not on the
subjective knowledge or belief of the transferee." Id. at 844.
568. Id. at 847-48, 848 n.8 (noting that the definition of "good faith" in Black's Law
Dictionary (1990) is broader and includes "'freedom from knowledge of circumstances
which ought to put the holder upon inquiry' and 'an honest intention to abstain from taking
any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with
absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction
unconscientious.'"). The latter definition is from Shauer v. Alterton, 151 U.S. 607, 622
(1894).
569. See supra text accompanying note 567.
570. Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re Bayou Grp.,
LLC), 396 B.R. 810, 851 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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The bankruptcy court's reasoning no doubt contributed to the district
court's reversal of the good faith standard used by the bankruptcy court."'
Nevertheless, the court laudably explained its reasoning in departing from
the traditional subjective meaning. Most courts do not bother with analysis
but simply state that the consensus is an objective standard.
Third, the current Code is to be interpreted in "a manner that is
consistent with prior bankruptcy practice unless Congress has expressly
indicated a different intent." 72 Because the Bankruptcy Act, like the Code,
did not define the term "good faith," it is reasonable to assume that
Congress intended for good faith to have the meaning in use at the time.
a.

The good faith standard has historically been subjective

Common law fraudulent transfer doctrine can be traced back to the
statutes of Elizabeth, which were created to combat the problem of
fraudulent transfers."' The primary fraud at that time was the "selling" of
assets to third parties but the retaining of use of the property by the
debtor." In these earliest scenarios, the purported transferee had to know
the transaction was not normal because the debtor retained the purportedly
transferred item. In contrast, both the statutes of Elizabeth and the
American application of the statutes dictated that a transfer was not
voidable if the transferee paid equivalent value without knowledge of the
fraud." Forty years before the Bankruptcy Act, the "settled American

571. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 439 B.R. 284, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
572. In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 444 B.R. 767, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (collecting
cases); see Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2473 (2010) ("[W]e will not read the
Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress
intended such a departure." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
573. Clayborn v. Hill, 1 Va. 177, 183 (1793) ("This inconvenience produced the Statutes
of Elizabeth respecting fraudulent conveyances. The preamble recites the mischief which
resulted from the possession remaining in one person, whilst the property was transferred to
another, whereby creditors, and purchasers, were defrauded; and the Judges stretched as far
as they well could, to carry this Statute into full effect."). See cases cited supra notes 69-71
and accompanying text.
574. Id. Judge Breyer recognized this as lying to creditors-the debtor "pretending he has
no property left, when he really has some (in the hands of his friend)." Boston Trading Grp.,
Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1508 (1st Cir. Mass. 1987).
575. Grumbles v. Sneed, 22 Tex. 565, 577 (1858) (noting "the settled American doctrine"
that "a bona fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration, is protected under the statutes of 13
and 27 Elizabeth, as adopted in this country, whether he purchases from a fraudulent
grantor, or a fraudulent grantee").
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doctrine" was that a good faith purchaser for value was protected from
avoidance of the transfer.'
Historically, analysis of good faith focused on fair consideration. If the
debtor receives fair consideration for the transfer, then there is no
fraudulent transfer-regardless of whether the transferee exhibited good
faith."' The good faith defense under the Bankruptcy Act was merely a
parenthetical within the avoidance statute that prohibited the bankruptcy
trustee from avoiding transfers to "purchasers in good faith and for a
present fair consideration.""' The Coder Court stated that "[t]he question as
to whether a transfer is made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
depends upon whether the act done is a bona fide [good faith]
transaction."579 The Court's analysis looked to the nature of the transaction
to determine good faith, rather than looking to good faith to determine the
nature of the transaction. "So long as the transfer does not diminish the
estate, the motives of debtor and grantee are immaterial."8 0
Although Congress modified the fraudulent transfer provision when it
enacted the Bankruptcy Code, it still did not define good faith. The
Bankruptcy Act had contained two good faith defenses, one for those who
paid "present fair equivalent value" and one for those who, although acting
in good faith, paid less than fair value." The Bankruptcy Code combined
both provisions into § 548(c).5 82 In doing so, Congress replaced the terms
"bona fide" and "without actual fraudulent intent" with the single term
"good faith."' One can reasonably assume, then, that Congress considered
the terms synonymous. If Congress had intended to create a new standard
for good faith, then it most certainly would have defined the term. By using
the term "good faith" to replace "without actual fraudulent intent,"
Congress supports the notion that good faith is simply honest dealing.

576. Id.
577. GLENN, supra note 83, § 300 ("So long as the transfer does not diminish the estate,
the motives of debtor and grantee are immaterial.").
578. In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 444 B.R. 767, 804 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (quoting
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 67(e)).
579. Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 244 (1909).
580. GLENN, supra note 83, § 300.
581. In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 444 B.R. 767,805-06 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
582. Id. at 806.
583. Id.
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b. Congress's use of the term "good faith" in a related section
supports a subjective definition
In addition to Congress's reliance on the historically subjective meaning
of good faith, Congress's use of the term "good faith" in a related Code
section supports a subjective definition. The fraudulent transfer statute
provides § 548(c) as a defense to avoidance of the transfer." If the
transferee took for value in good faith, then the trustee cannot recover the
transfer. If the transferee does not fall within the protection of § 548(c),
then the bankruptcy trustee uses § 550 to recover the property for the
estate.' The § 548(c) defense protects the initial transferee.8 Section 550
provides an additional defense to subsequent transferees.ss7 In § 550(b)(1)
the transfer may not be recovered from a subsequent transferee who gave
value in good faith and without knowledge of the transfer.' 8 Congress
distinguished good faith from notice or knowledge by listing them as two
separate elements of the defense. Additionally, Congress eliminated the
knowledge requirement for immediate or mediate transferee's of the initial
subsequent transferees.ss' In other words, the initial transferee may retain
the transfer under § 548(c) if he takes for value in good faith. The initial
subsequent transferee may keep the transfer if he takes for value, in good
faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer. Later
transferees may keep the transfer if they took in good faith. A definition of
good faith that incorporated inquiry notice would be nonsensical in
§ 550(b)(2) where a transferee may have good faith even if he has actual
knowledge of the voidability of the transfer. "To hinge the good faith
analysis on notice, or even actual knowledge, would require that one
definition be given to good faith when evaluating the first transfer and a

584. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
585. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
586. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) ("[A] transferee or obligee of such a transfer or obligation that
takes for value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferredor may
enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to the extent that such transferee or
obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation." (emphasis
added)).
587. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) ("The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section
from-(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or
antecedent debt, in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer
avoided; or (2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such transferee.").
588. Id.

589. Id.
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second definition given to good faith for the second transfer."s9 0 Thus,
Congress could not have intended the term "good faith" in § 548 to have a
different meaning than the same term in § 550, especially since it did not
define the term.
3. A Shift to an Objective Standard Destroys the Good Faith Defense
Investor victims of the Bayou Ponzi scheme tried unsuccessfully to
convince the bankruptcy court that the objective standard effectively
destroys the good faith defense. The investor victims noted that "[i] t would
be an almost impossible standard to meet."' The objective standard
requires that an investor make a diligent inquiry if a reasonably prudent
investor would have become suspicious, and that, as a result of the
investigation, the investor "have no lingering concerns or suspicions
regarding the transferor and the transfer."5 92 If a defendant is relying on the
§ 548(c) good faith defense, then by definition the debtor was engaged in
actual fraud.'9 Under the objective standard, a diligent inquiry that exposes
the fraud will give the investor actual knowledge and bar receipt of future
good faith transfers. Because, by definition, the transferor is involved in
fraudulent activity, an inquiry that does not expose the fraud can always be
said to have been insufficiently diligent. Only a "diligent" inquiry that
results in a belief by the investor, with no lingering doubts, that there is no
fraud will preserve the good faith defense.594
The Bayou bankruptcy court rejected these observations, stating that the
investor victims "misstate[] the case law." 95 The court emphasized that
§ 548(c) is an affirmative defense and therefore each "redeeming investor
must prove that he took the redemption payment 'in good faith."' 9
According to the court, an investor had good faith only if he took "his
investment out of the particular Bayou fund not because he had some
information that there was some infirmity in the fund, but because of some
other reason personal to him and extraneous to the well-being of the fund

590. Lutterbein, supra note 562, at 442.
591. Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re Bayou Grp.,
LLC), 396 B.R. 810, 851 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
592. Id.
593. Id.
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. Id.
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and its remaining investors."' The court declared again that the "case law
holds that the redeeming investor cannot sustain his burden to prove his
good faith if the evidence shows that he was on objective notice of some
infirmity in the fund.""
The district court rejected the bankruptcy court's expansion of objective
notice to include "[s]ome infirmity in the integrity of [the fund's]
management," replacing it with notice of insolvency."9 The court noted that
the bankruptcy court's objective standard combined with its expanded
inquiry notice requirements "render the good faithdefense largely illusory
whenever a transferor is actually engaged in fraud or is insolvent.""oo But the
district court retained the requirement that once a reasonable man would be
on notice, the investor must conduct a diligent inquiry to the point that his
fears are allayed and he firmly believes there is no fraudulent activity.601
Since the transferor is, in fact, conducting a fraudulent scheme, it is difficult
to see how the objective standard affords any hope of a good faith defense.
The bankruptcy court declared that it was "precisely the purpose and the
effect of the objective approach adopted by all the courts in interpreting
§ 548(c) to virtually rescind the availability of the 'good faith' defense" in
cases where a diligent inquiry leaves any lingering suspicions.6 02
While rejecting the investor-victim's argument that the requirement of a
diligent inquiry that turns up nothing will destroy the good faith defense,
the court acknowledges that inquiries will never reach that level of
diligence.
As a practical matter, few if any "inquiry notice" investigations
will be carried on to the point of actually proving fraud. Once the
investigation encounters evasion or stonewalling exacerbating
the concerns caused by the original red flag, the sensible investor

597. Id.
598. Id. (emphasis added).
599. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 439 B.R. 284, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
600. Id. at 316.
601. Id.
602. Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC, 396 B.R. 810 at 852 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Although the district court reversed the court's definition of good faith, it merely
moved the inquiry line from "any infirmity" to "insolvency or fraud." The outcome is the
same if an investor suspects that the business is insolvent.
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will promptly redeem without spending more time and money
on further inquiry.6
The objective standard requires of investors actions that are neither
reasonable nor prudent. It is difficult, then, to see how such actions can be
legally "objective"-what a reasonably prudent investor" would do.
In regard to one group of investor victims, the bankruptcy court noted
that "[t] here is not a single element of 'bad faith' or misconduct of any sort
on the part of [this defendant] or its clients. Quite the contrary, the ...
decisions ... were in every respect proper and entirely reasonable in the
circumstances." 6" The court, nevertheless, denied the good faith defense,
reasoning that one can lack good faith but not necessarily have "bad faith."
Traditional case precedent and doctrine hold that a fraudulent transfer
must be malum in se-a bad act.60 Nevertheless, the Bayou bankruptcy
court declared that Congress did not intend the good faith requirement, or
fraudulent transfer avoidance, to deter bad conduct.6 06 "Like Section 547,
which requires innocent creditors to refund payments of money owed to
them within ninety days of a bankruptcy filing, Section 548 seeks to
promote a limited degree of equality of treatment among creditors .... "607
In its support of the objective standard, the court thereby ignored wellestablished Supreme Court precedent distinguishing between the purpose
and nature of preferences and fraudulent transfers. Conflating the two, the
court used the objective standard to create a "super preference"608 that can
claw back from investor-victims who exhibited no "bad faith." Although the
district court reined in the bankruptcy court, the natural result of an
objective standard is exactly what the Bayou investors feared and the district
court acknowledged. "[T]he good faith defense [is rendered] largely illusory
whenever a transferor is actually engaged in fraud or is insolvent."609

603. Id. Although the bankruptcy court's standard was modified by the district court, the
bankruptcy court's position is the natural evolution when embracing an objective standard.
With hindsight, courts find it easier to reason that a reasonable investor would have seen
indications of fraud.
604. Id. at 866.
605. Van Iderstine v. Nat'l Disc. Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913).
606. Bayou Accredited Fund,LLC, 396 B.R. at 866.

607. Id.
608. See discussion supra Part III.B.
609. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 439 B.R. 284,316 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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4. The Shift to an Objective Standard Applies "Equitable" Policies
Inconsistently
Fraudulent transfer is a legal, not equitable remedy. While legal doctrines
provide stability, equitable ones allow courts opportunity to fashion rules
they believe fit the facts of the case. This judicial power is detrimental to
business.
a. The policies impose an unreasonable expectation
An investor with a little money to invest might wonder how to protect
herself against the claw back of her money if a company should turn out to
be a Ponzi scheme. Under traditional principles of fraudulent transfer
avoidance, a person who "traded normally" and exchanged equivalent value
could be confident that a transfer would not be avoided as fraudulent.
Traditionally, the concepts of good faith and equivalent value, along with
arm's-length trading, were intertwined. Today, there is no such assurance.
Courts that have adopted the objective standard for good faith create a
mythical "reasonably prudent investor." Courts have determined that this
prudent investor would spot red flags of insolvency or fraud. Courts, with
the benefit of perfect hindsight, decide what a prudent investor would have
noticed and attribute that knowledge to all investors under the "knew or
should have known" standard. This is in spite of the fact that thousands of
similarly situated investors, some of whom were sophisticated businessmen
and experienced traders, failed to spot the signs of fraud."'o
The Madoff scheme presents an even starker picture of the unrealistic
expectation that the court can determine what a "reasonably prudent
investor" "should have known." A reasonably prudent investor, realizing
that he or she does not have the funds or ability to investigate a firm, relies
on regulatory oversight. A cautiously prudent investor may also limit
investments to those that are insured."' Bernard Madoff and his hedge fund
610. See id. Although the Bayou district court rolled back the most egregious extensions
of the bankruptcy court's objective standard, it still found that investors who "should have
known" of the company's insolvency because of red flags lacked good faith. Paul Sinclair &
Brendan McPherson, Red Flags of Fraud: Background for Due Diligence, 30-4 AMER. BANK.
INSTITUTE J. 34, 34 (2011).
611. Sullivan, supra note 447, at 1593-96. Many prudent Madoff victims had investments
insured by the SIPC. Id. A prudent investor might rely heavily on the fact that SIPC-insured
brokers are regulated by the SEC. Id. Prudent investors might also rely on the SIPC's express
promise that insured securities would be replaced (even if the broker never bought them) if
malfeasance by the broker is discovered. Id. These prudent investors, however, were left
holding empty accounts when the court allowed the SIPC to change its guarantee. As a
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were under the regulatory authority of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.612 The SEC investigated Madoff and his company at least five
times over two decades, yet never discovered Madoffs massive fraud.' The
appearance of legitimacy makes Ponzi schemes difficult to see.' "Red
flags," that seem obvious in hindsight, were not obvious at the time. Every
fraudulent schemer needs a plausible investment strategy to lure people in.
Madoff developed a complex investment strategy that seemed plausible.'
Although fraudulent schemes of the past may have targeted the ignorant or
greedy,6" 6 modern schemes lure in the prudent. Madoff, for example, was
able to lure in reasonably prudent investors because the investments were
insured by the SIPC, regulated by the government, and recommended by
investment professionals. Courts, using hindsight, determine which "red
flags"-missed by experienced business people and government
regulators-should have been seen by investor victims.
b. Case-by-case decisions
Rather than rule in a manner consistent with law and precedent, courts
handling large Ponzi scheme cases struggle with finding an equitable
solution. When defining terms or constructing tests, courts often are
"influenced substantially by the equities of the particular fact situations
before the courts."' This influence would be less troubling if the doctrine
being applied was an equitable doctrine instead of a legal one. As courts
become untethered from the well-established traditional interpretations of
fraudulent transfer doctrine, decisions are "marked by a lack of clarity if not
outright confusion."61 An example of this lack of clarity is the use in the
result, investor-victims who prudently invested in a federally insured and regulated security
suffer the same losses as those who chose riskier investments. Id.
612. Id. at 1596.
613. Id. at 1622.
614. Id.
615. Id. at 1622-23.
616. In his blog, Becker-Posner Blog, Judge Richard Posner describes victims of classic
schemes as "greedy dopes," "the least sophisticated," and "suckers." Posner, supra note 19.
This view of Ponzi victims reflects the lack of sympathy for those who have been swindled
and suggests why courts allow investor victims to be pursued by bankruptcy trustees.
617. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 439 B.R. 284, 309-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal citation
omitted).
618. Id. at 309 ("As a result, courts have struggled in applying [inquiry notice], and the
case law discussing Section 548(c)'s good faith affirmative defense is marked by a lack of
clarity if not outright confusion.").
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objective standard of the term "inquiry notice." Under traditional tests of
good faith, the standard was a subjective one-honesty and lack of
knowledge or participation in the fraud. In contrast, courts applying the
objective standard "focus on the circumstances specific to the transfer at
issue-that is, whether a transferee 'reasonably should have known ... of
the fraudulent intent underlying the transfer."'109 By focusing on factually
specific determinants, the definition of inquiry notice becomes a moving
target. An investor victim might be on inquiry notice and, therefore, lack
good faith if he was on notice of "a debtor's fraudulent purpose[,]" 6 2 0 or if he
was on notice of "the possibly fraudulent nature of the transaction[,]"621or if
he was on notice of facts that would have alerted him to "the debtor's
fraudulent purpose" if he had not "chosen to remain willfully ignorant of
[the] facts,"622 or if he was on inquiry notice "of any facts that would have
caused a reasonable person to make further inquiry."62 3 Some courts add
another layer of analysis by rejecting a generic, reasonable person standard,
for a modified, reasonable person standard based on the "standards, norms,
practices, sophistication, and experience generally possessed by participants
in the transferee's industry or class."6 24 Courts thereby apply inconsistent
"objective" standards and deprive investors of stability and predictability.
5. A Shift to the Objective Standard Harms Business
The purpose of the Bankruptcy Clause is to promote the orderly flow of
interstate commerce. 625 Bankruptcy and business are intimately

619. Id. at 311 (quoting Jobin v. McKay (In reM & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1336
(10th Cir. 1996)).
620. Id. at 311-12 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc.,
916 F.2d 528, 536 (9th Cir. 1990)).
621. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Boyer v. Crown Stock Distribution, Inc., No. 1:06CV-409RM, 2009 WL 418275, at *14 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 17, 2009).
622. Id. (quoting Luzinski v. Gosman (In re Gosman), No. 01-30953-BKC-PGH, 2005
Bankr. LEXIS 3183, at *52 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2005)).
623. Id. (quoting Development Specialists, Inc. v. Hamilton Bank, N.A. (In re Model
Imperial, Inc.), 250 B.R. 776, 798 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000)). The Bayou court went on to cite
the varied objective tests from more than twenty other courts. Id. at 311-12, 310 n.23.
624. Id. at 313. The Bayou bankruptcy court thus phrased its issue as whether the
information "would have put a reasonably prudent institutional hedge fund investor on
inquiry notice" that the debtor was insolvent or had a fraudulent purpose. Id. (emphasis
added).
625. NORTON, supra note 44, § 1:3. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
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intertwined.626 At the heart of every Ponzi scheme transfer is a business
transaction. Although hindsight may be nearly perfect, an investor
evaluating the risk and reward of a business opportunity does not have the
benefit of hindsight. Every investor must make his decision to invest based
on the risk that he might not be repaid any or all of his principal, that the
company might go bankrupt, that the company might be perpetrating a
62 7
fraud, or that an executive or manager might embezzle the funds. Each
investor in an enterprise that turns out to be a Ponzi scheme made the
628
decision based on the same risks and the same hope of reward. Business
must have a consistent and stable bankruptcy system in order to make
risk/reward decisions.
Every investor knows that she may lose her investment because of a bad
investment choice. Emphatically, that is not what fraudulent transfer
avoidance is. Rather, avoidance means the clawing back of money already
received on the investment, and possibly already spent. Although an
investor knows she may lose her investment, she does not expect the funds
in her own possession to be at risk. Under the current system, and with the
proliferation of sophisticated and credible Ponzi schemes, an investor who
redeems a certificate of deposit,629 sells a security through a licensed
broker,63 or invests money in a business 63 ' is vulnerable to claw back for up
to six years.632 To fend off the trustee attacks requires attorney fees and
626. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 465-66 ("As James Madison
observed, 'the power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected
with the regulation of commerce and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their
property may lie or be removed into the different states, that the expediency of it seems not
likely to be drawn into question.'").
627. See In re Unified Commercial Capital Inc., 260 B.R. 343, 351 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
2001), affd sub nom. In re Unified Commercial Capital, 01-MBK-6004L, 2002 WL 32500567
(W.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002).
628. See id.
629. See, e.g., Barasch, supra note 32, at 924 (discussing the Stanford Ponzi scheme where
victims purchased fictitious certificates of deposit).
630. See, e.g., Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that Madoff
Securities was a licensed and insured securities dealer), motion to certify appeal denied, 466
B.R. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
631. See, e.g., In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 1990)
(finding a Ponzi scheme where investors invested in a foliage business).
632. Sinclair, supra note 28, at 78 ("For the investors with Bernie Madoff, or the several
other Ponzi cases now emerging in 2008's cataclysmic market reversal, a broad and
expansive reading of good faith can make the return of $125 million to the investors in
Bayou look like pocket change. This is even more troublesome because Bayou, Madoff and
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lengthy litigation. And to add insult to injury, a court may add prejudgment interest to the avoided transfer.3 3
Uncertainty chills investment in business. An investor naturally tries to
maximize return on investment while avoiding scams that seem too good to
be true. Inconsistent rulings by courts assessing what is an "unreasonable"
rate of return make the evaluation even more difficult-especially since a
wrong choice can defeat a future claim of good faith.
In re Carrozzella & Richardson, a Connecticut district court
found that guaranteed 15% interest payments were reasonable
and treated the payments as favorably as any other trade creditor,
like the utility company. An Ohio bankruptcy court, however,
found returns of 12% to 24% to be an unreasonable rate of return
in the context of a Ponzi scheme. This split between the courts
perpetuates inconsistency and unpredictability. For some
investors, section 548(c) provides a total shield from a clawback
action, but for others the defense is more of a brass ring hanging
just out of reach. 3
Commerce requires predictability. Bankruptcy laws provide that
predictability. Congress has balanced competing policy concerns like
limitations periods, distributional enhancement, and distributional equality.
When courts substitute equitable judgments for the legal remedy of
fraudulent transfer, outcomes become unpredictable.3 s
[T]he United States Supreme Court has emphasized that where,
as here, the operative language of an applicable statute is plain
and unqualified, courts should be loath to announce equitable
exceptions thereto. The creation of such non-textual equitable
exceptions is especially problematic in the context of fraudulent
transfer law, which is itself equitable in nature-acting to upset

other cases are in New York, which has a six-year statute of limitations for fraudulent
transfers.").
633. Agric. Research, 916 F.2d at 541-42.
634. Jessica D. Gabel et al., The Collapse of Financial Fraud: Measuring Bankruptcy
Avoidance Actions, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 587, 610 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
635. See George P. Roach, Rescission in Texas: A Suspect Remedy, 31 REv. LITIG. 493, 495
(2012) ("Sitting in equity, a trial judge has greater authority to issue more forceful orders to
the litigants and greater discretion to deny particular equitable remedies than for remedies at
law. The resulting unpredictability and risk to the final outcome is compounded by the fact
that equitable remedies are not well understood by lawyers or the judiciary. . . .").

2013]

VICTIMIZED AGAIN

301

the pre-existing contractual rights and expectations between
transferor and transferee. 6

IV. PROPOSAL
As one court noted, the ideal outcome when a Ponzi scheme collapses
would be for all victims to receive back their money from the perpetrator's
assets. 637 The perpetrator, however, has already spent the received fundseither on personal expenses or on payments to earlier investors.6 ' The court
suggested that the next best thing would be to force all victims to share pro
rata in the losses. 63 9 The court noted that attempts to claw back money
involve expensive court litigation and would not be effective against
transfers made prior to the avoidance window." The court concluded that
courts, "unable to do perfect justice," must assume that justice will be best
served by simply applying the Code as promulgated by Congress."
Congress has already drawn a line between redistribution and
"allow[ing] the losses to rest where they fell."6 2 Congress has already
balanced the needs of debtors, creditors, and the business world by
establishing two distinct avoidance sections-one for preferences and one
for fraudulent transfers. Congress has already balanced justice and the need
for repose by establishing specific time limitations on avoidance. If the
balance is to be changed, Congress must change it.63

636. In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 270 B.R. 92, 99 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2001).
637. In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 887 (D. Utah 1987).
638. Id.
639. Id.
640. Id.
641. Id.
642. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 776 (9th Cir. 2008).
643. In 2010, a bi-partisan group of representatives introduced legislation that would
have protected Ponzi scheme victims. Perlmutter & Members of Congress Introduce
Legislation to Improve Relief for Victims of Madoff 6 All Ponzi Scheme, (April 15, 2010),
http://perlmutter.house.gov/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=726. The bill
was sponsored by U.S. Representatives Gary Ackerman (D-NY), Peter King (R-NY), Ron
Klein (D-FL), Dan Maffei (D-NY), Ed Perlmutter (D-CO) and Jackie Speier (D-CA), all of
whom were members of the House Financial Services Committee. Id. The bill would have
prohibited "clawing-back any money from victims unless the bilked investor was proven to
be complicit or negligent in their participation in the Ponzi scheme in bankruptcy court." Id.
The bill was referred to committee where it died. H.R. 1987 (112th): Ponzi Scheme Investor
Protection Act of 2011, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hrl987.
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Nevertheless, because of the misapplication of these statutes in the Ponzi
context, Congress should add a provision to the fraudulent transfer section
of the Code to clarify the limits on avoidance in a Ponzi scheme situation.
Congress could easily clarify the fraudulent transfer issue by adding a
subsection to § 548.' In that section, after actual and constructive
fraudulent transfers are described in § 548(a)(1),"s Congress codified as
§ 548(a)(2)6 an exception for transfers to charities." Congress could add a
new subsection-(a) (3)-which states:
(3) A transfer made pursuant to a Ponzi scheme shall not be
considered to be a transfer covered under paragraph (1)(A) in
any case in which(A) the transfer was consistent with the practices of the
debtor;
(B) the aggregate value of transfers from the transferee to
the debtor exceeds the aggregate value of the transfers
from the debtor to the transferee; and
(C) the transferee was not an insider or acted without good
faith.
Definitions for the terms "Ponzi scheme" and "good faith" should be
included in § 548(d)(2)," which already lists definitions for this section.
Two new subsections could be added as (d)(2)(F) and (G):
(F) "Ponzi scheme" means a fraudulent investment scheme in
which money contributed by later investors generates
artificially high dividends for the original investors, whose
example attracts even larger investments, and money from
the new investors is used directly to repay or pay interest to
644. For the text and discussion of 11 U.S.C. § 548, see supra note 197.

645. Id.
646. 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(2) ("A transfer of a charitable contribution to a qualified religious
or charitable entity or organization shall not be considered to be a transfer covered under
paragraph (1)(B) in any case in which-(A) the amount of that contribution does not exceed
15 percent of the gross annual income of the debtor for the year in which the transfer of the
contribution is made; or (B) the contribution made by a debtor exceeded the percentage
amount of gross annual income specified in subparagraph (A), if the transfer was consistent
with the practices of the debtor in making charitable contributions.").

647. Id.
648. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2) ("In this section-(A) 'value' means property, or satisfaction
or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an
unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor....").
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earlier investors, without any operation or revenueproducing activity other than the continual raising of new
funds."'
(G) "Good faith" means honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.6 o
The result of adding this language would be to codify the well-established
principles used prior to the Agricultural Research decision. The
presumption that Ponzi scheme payments are avoidable under the actual
fraud provision would be replaced with a presumption that they are not.
This would, at least to the extent that the debtor received value from the
transferee, force the bankruptcy trustee to avoid the transfers under the
constructive fraud provision. Any "net-loser" victim would be protected
from the trustee's avoidance actions unless the trustee could show that the
victim had gotten an unusual payment or had acted in bad faith. "Net
winner" victims would be vulnerable only to the extent of the fictitious
profits received. Further, defining good faith would ensure that transferees
would be targeted only if the transferee knew that the transaction was
abnormal. This would return the good faith standard to that established by
the Supreme Court in Harrell,1 Van Iderstine," and Coder.6 S3 Unless
Congress creates an exception for Ponzi schemes, the fraudulent transfer
doctrine should be applied to Ponzi schemes in the same way it is applied to
other bankrupt businesses.
Until Congress acts, courts should return to the well-established
principles of the fraudulent transfer doctrine. First, the court must
determine if the transfer was a preference or a fraudulent transfer. If the
transfer merely prefers one creditor over another, then it is not avoidable
under the fraudulent transfer statute-regardless of whether the debtor had
actual intent to defraud. Since Ponzi scheme victims have a rescission claim,
a transfer up to the amount of principal invested would be safe from the
claws of a trustee because such transfers merely prefer an earlier investor
creditor over a later one.
Second, a subjective standard of good faith should be applied. Although
sometimes phrased as a subjective-objective test, "knew or should have
649. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1198 (8th ed. 2004).

650. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2012).
651. Harrell v. Beall, 84 U.S. 590, 591 (1873). See discussion supra Part III.C.1.b.
652. Van Iderstine v. Nat'1 Disc. Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582-83 (1913). See discussion supra
Part II.B.1.b.
653. Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 242 (1909). See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a.
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known," the issue is whether the transferee knew at the time of the initial
transaction that a fraud was being perpetrated.6 54 Such knowledge of or
willful blindness regarding the fraud makes the transferee, in essence, a coperpetrator of the crime. The well-established standard differs from
analyzing what a transferee knew about the debtor's insolvency later when
payments were received. It is unreasonable to find an investor lacks good
faith simply because he suspects the business may be experiencing financial
difficulty and withdraws his money.' A lack of good faith should be found
only when the investor fails to act honestly.
V. CONCLUSION

Ponzi scheme victims face a second wave of financial devastation when
courts use an avoidability presumption and employ an objective "prudent
investor" standard for good faith. The protection for victims should be
restored. Courts should return to well-established principles of fraudulent
transfer by carefully distinguishing between fraudulent transfers and mere
preferences and by returning to the subjective standard for good faith.

654. See discussion supra Part III.C.
655. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.

